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Playing The Loving Card: 
Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy 
David Organ Coolidge • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Of all the legal arguments offered in favor of legalizing "same-sex mar-
riage"1 the one with the greatest rhetorical punch is the Loving analogy. 
"Just as the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Virginia's ban on interracial 
marriage in Loving v. Virginia2," the analogy goes, "so the courts should 
strike down bans on same-sex marriage." In one fell swoop one can invoke 
race, civil rights, and the freedom to marry while simultaneously painting 
one's opponents as the Bull Connors of the 1990s. 
The use of Loving in our time is preeminently a political use. In the 
debate over the definition of marriage, Loving is the wedge, the theme 
piece, the call to arms. One might call Loving "the race card" of the mar-
riage debate. Advocates are "playing the Loving card." 
• Copyright© 1998 by David Orgon Coolidge. Director, Marriage Law Project, Washington, 
D.C.; Research Fellow, Interdisciplinary Program in Law and Religion, Columbus School of Law and 
The Catholic University of America; Adjunct Fellow, Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, 
D.C.; J.D. and Public Interest Law Scholar, Georgetown University Law Center; M.A., Howard 
University School of Divinity. 
This text was originally delivered in November, 1997 at Law and the Politics of Marriage: 
Loving v. Virginia After Thirty Years, at The Catholic University of America, co-sponsored by the 
Columbus School of Law, Howard University School of Law, and the J. Reuben Clark School of 
Law at Brigham Young University. I have retained its informal flavor. 
My thanks to Bernard Dobranski, Dean of the Columbus School of Law, and Professor Robert 
Destro, Director of the CSL's Interdisciplinary Program in Law and Religion, for supporting the 
Marriage Law Project and making the Laving conference part of the Centennial series of the 
Columbus School of Law. Thanks also to Duke Dorotheo, Marian Lally, Joanne Lytle-Miller, Greg 
Stack and Joan Vorrasi for making the Conference so successful. Between Conference and 
publication I received excellent technical and intellectual assistance from Jeremy Root, Eva Simmons, 
Teresa Stanton Collen, Richard Duncan, Lynn Wardle, and William C. Duncan. 
I. I put the term "same-sex marriage" in quotation marks here to indicate my belief that 
same-sex unions are not marriages, and should not be called marriages. I realize that this may be 
deeply offensive to those other views, and I regret this. For more on my views, the reader may 
consult David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage, 
38 S. TEx. L. REV. I (1997). 
I do not know Ninia, Genora, Pat, Joe, Tammy or Toni personally, although I have friends on 
the Islands who do. Should they read this, I want them to know that I believe they deserve respect 
as persons and as fellow citizens. Nothing I write here is meant to injure them in any way. In this 
paper, I focus on the role that Laving plays in the highly debatable political and legal claims being 
made by their attorneys. I try to do so remembering that I am participating in a debate that involves 
real human beings. Indeed, the marriage debate involves all of our hopes, fears and dreams for the 
future of our communities. 
2. 388 U.S. I (1967). 
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Of course, this is nothing new. For almost thirty years, there has been 
a spirited debate going on about the implications of Loving for the status 
and rights of same-sex couples in our society.3 From Baker v. Nelson, in 
1971, to Baker v. Vermont, in 1997, plaintiffs and states have squared off 
over the meaning of Loving.4 With the thirtieth anniversary of Loving, sup-
porters of same-sex marriage have been asserting "the Loving analogy" 
with increasing confidence and boldness. Indeed, the analogy is now pre-
sented as a self-evident fact. 5 
The academic literature on "same-sex marriage" only reinforces this 
impression. Between 1990 and June 1995, seventy-five law review articles 
or essays in major legal periodicals were published on the issue. Sixty-nine 
of these were openly supportive of same-sex marriage, but only one sup-
ported marriage defined as the union of one man and one woman. 6 Articles 
and essays that discuss "the meaning of Loving" in anything more than a 
cursory fashion argue, almost without exception, that same-sex marriage 
should be legalized based on Loving.7 
3. Twenty-six years ago, Robert J. Sickels anticipated that Loving might eventually be used 
to challenge laws that define marriage as the union of a man and a woman. "Logically," he 
speculated, "it would be simple to add to the choice of race, in Loving, the choices of number, of 
sex, and of duration." RACE, MARRIAGE AND THE LAw 148 (1972). The first law review articles on 
the issue were also published in 1972; see Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional 
Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. I, app. A at 96. 
4. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (reaffirming the existing marriage law); 
Baker v. Vermont, No. Sl009-97Cnc (Vt. Sup. Ct., Dec. 17, 1997), appeal docketed, No. 98-32 (Vt. 
1998) (same, but with considerably less enthusiasm). Between the two cases, the most significant 
decisions actually discussing the relevance of Loving for the "same-sex marriage" debate were Singer 
v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (rejecting the Loving analogy) and Baehr v. Lewin. 
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), sub. nom. Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996) (accepting by a 
plurality, but with an aggressive dissent). 
5. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & David Yun, The Lessons of Loving vs. Virginia, ROCKY 
MouNTAINS NEWS, June 27, 1997, at 57 A ("Same-sex attraction is as natural and inborn as one's 
race, and deploring or condemning it is as senseless as the prohibitions on interracial marriage the 
Warren court thankfully struck down in Loving vs. Virginia. ln 30 years, will we look back, as we 
do now, and wonder how we could have been so blind - or heartless?"); Deb Price, Civil Rites: 
Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage Mirror Those That Kept the Races Apart, DETROIT NEWS, 
April 18, 1997, at El: 
[W]e can take heart from the parallels to the successful struggle to make interracial 
marriage legal nationwide. Those parallels are strong, numerous and encouraging. They're 
also instructive. We've much to learn from the way that earlier marriage-rights battle was 
eventually won - especially from the reluctant but ultimately decisive role played by the 
Supreme Court in making good on our Constitution's promise of equal protection for all. 
/d.; Eric Zorn, Marriage Issue Just as Plain as Black and White, CHI. TRIB., May 19, 1996, at I 
(using racist arguments from the last hundred years, but substituting "gays and lesbians," to make 
a rhetorical point: "The stench is familiar. The future is listening."). 
6. See Wardle, supra note 3, at 18-26 (discussing imbalance), 97-101 (offering a 
comprehensive list of articles). 
7. A focused search for articles between 1990 and 1997 which discuss both Loving and 
"same-sex marriage" yields 76 citations. Of these, 22 have substantive discussions of the Loving 
analogy. Twenty support the analogy; two question it. 
The three most prominent exponents of the Loving analogy have been William Eskridge, Andrew 
Koppelman, and Mark Strasser. For William N. Eskridge, Jr.'s views, see THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX 
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In short, disagreement with the "correct" view of Loving is hard to 
find in the legal academy. Although legal-theoretical debates about the 
relationship between race, sex, and sexual orientation are important, it is 
hard to learn much from them if there is not much debate going on. Debate 
is going on, however, in specific states.8 Perhaps this is as it should be, if 
the debate is to be democratic. Perhaps something can be gleaned by look-
ing at these debates in a concrete situation. 
MARRJAGE 153-63 (1996); A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 19 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1504-10 (1993). 
For Andrew Koppelman's views, see The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex 
Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988); Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is 
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Same-Sex Marriage and Public Policy: The 
Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 105 (1996); Three Arguments for Gay Rights, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 1636, 1661 (1997). For Mark Strasser's view, see LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX 
MARRJAGE AND THE CONS1ITUTION 66-69 (1997); Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the 
Miscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 1001 (1991); Domestic Relations Jurisprudence 
and the Great, Slumbering Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection and Fundamental 
Interests, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 921, 927 (1995); Constitutional Limitations and Baehr Possibilities: 
On Retroactive Legislation, Reasonable Expectations, and Manifest Injustice, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 271, 
275-76 (1998). 
Other sympathetic discussions of the Loving analogy include Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet 
Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. 
REV. 561, 601 n.l58 (1997); Kathryn Dean Kendell, Principles and Prejudice: Lesbian and Gay 
Civil Marriage and the Realization of Equality, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 81, 84-85 (1996); Toni M. 
Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 68 (1996); Rodney Patton, Queerly 
Unconstitutional?: South Carolina Bans Same-Sex Marriage 48 S.C. L. REV. 685, _at n.5 (1997) 
(forthcoming 1998); Richard Ante, Book Note, 15 B.C. THIRD WoRLD L. J. 421, 438-49 (1995) 
(reviewing JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PRE-MODERN EUROPE (1994)); Anne M. Burton, 
Note, Gay Marriage-a Modern Proposal: Applying Baehr v. Lewin to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, 3 INDEP. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 177, 180-84 (1995); Heather Hodges, 
Note, Dean v. The District of Columbia· Goin' to the Chapel and We're Gonna Get Married, 5 AM. 
U. J. GENDER & L. 93, 136 (1996); William M. Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and the 
Right of Privacy, 103 YALE L.J. 1495, 1506 (1994); Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? 
Constitutional and Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 499, 520 (1995); Jeffrey J. Swart, Comment, The Wedding Luau - Who is Invited?: Hawaii, 
Same-Sex Marriage, and Emerging Realities, 43 Emory L.J. 1577, 1606 (1994); James Trosino, 
Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 13 B.U. L. REV. 93, 
107-16 (1993); Kevin Aloysius Zambrowicz, Comment, "To Love and Honor all the Days of Your 
Life": A Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage?, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 907, 932 (1994). 
The two pieces which question the Loving analogy are Lynne Marie Kohm, A Reply to 
"Principles and Prejudice": Marriage and the Realization that Principles Win Over Political Will, 
22 J. CONTEMP. L. 293, 299-300 (1996) and Wardle, supra note 3, at 75-82. These pieces have now 
been joined by Coolidge, supra note I; Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer: Homosexual 
Marriage and Moral Discernment, 12 BYU J. PuB. L. 239 (1998); Lynne Marie Kohm, Liberty and 
Marriage- Baehr and Beyond: Due Process in 1998, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 253 (1998); Jay Alan 
Sekulow and John Tuskey, Sex and Sodomy and Apples and Oranges-Does the Constitution Require 
States to Grant a Right to Do the Impossible?, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 309 (1988); Raymond C. 
O'Brien, Single-Gender Marriage: A Religious Perspective, 7 TEMPLE PoL. & Civ. RTS. REV. 1301 
(1998); Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional Right to Marry, 1790-1990, 41 
Howard L. 1. (forthcoming, 1998). 
8. A Nexis search of newspaper editorials and commentary between 1990 and 1997 on the 
specific topic of "same-sex marriage" and interracial marriage yielded 62 different articles totaling 
almost 150 pages of text. Only twelve articles appeared prior to 1996; fifty appeared in 1996 and 
1997. On the use of the Loving analogy in the lawsuit in Hawaii, see infra. 
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Nowhere has the Loving analogy been more ubiquitous and significant 
than in Hawaii, which has been "ground zero" in the definition-of-mar-
riage debate. Indeed in the Aloha State, Loving has appeared so often, and 
so significantly, in court documents, newspaper opinion pieces, official 
reports, political advertisements, and legislative documents, that it would 
be almost impossible to catalog the number of times it has been invoked or 
contested. 
I will begin by looking at the use of Loving in Hawaii's Baehr debate. 
Then I will point out some problematic aspects of the analogy that have 
not typically been mentioned by the advocates of same-sex marriage. I will 
illustrate this by reference to contrasting amici curie. Based on this, I con-
clude "the Loving analogy" has been of vital political utility to the advo-
cates of same-sex marriage precisely because it is more about politics than 
law. Indeed, those advocating "same-sex marriage" are not making a legal 
argument; instead, they are "playing the Loving card." 
II. "THE LOVING ANALOGY" IN ACTION 
A. What is the Analogy? 
What exactly is the Loving analogy? The answer is more complex than 
it might appear. It can be formulated in different ways, ranging along a 
spectrum from somewhat friendly to outright hostile. The difference in the 
formulations becomes more evident if the analogy is presented sequen-
tially. Here is a relatively mild-sounding version: 
As Loving is about broadening marriage to include interracial 
couples, so Baehr is about broadening marriage to include 
same-sex couples. 
It can also be stated in the following manner: 
As thirty years ago, people defined marriage as something be-
tween people of the same race, but this was redefined, so today 
people define marriage as a relationship between people of the 
same sexual orientation, and this should be redefined. 
Then again, the alleged analogy can be restated in another, slightly more 
pointed way: 
As race was irrelevant to marriage then, so sex is irrelevant to 
marriage now. 
Finally, here is a statement of the analogy which exemplifies the hostile 
end of the spectrum: 
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As Virginia's law was enacted by racist citizens and elected 
officials, embodied the ideology of white supremacy, and was 
validly overturned by the courts, so Hawaii's law was enacted 
by heterosexist citizens and elected officials, and embodies the 
ideology of heterosexual supremacy, and should be overturned 
by the courts. 
Needless to say, this formulation is clearly not designed to persuade one's 
opponents. It is a subtle way of telling people that they are no different 
than a bunch of Jim Crow racists, and ought to be ashamed of themselves 
- so ashamed that they should get out of the way and leave the definition 
of marriage to the courts. 
Now, let us see how these ways of formulating the argument have ap-
peared in Hawaii. 
B. The Role of the Analogy in the Baehr Litigation9 
Until the time of the 1993 plurality opinion of the Hawaii Supreme 
Court, it was the State that made a point of discussing Loving, to affirm the 
due process right to marry rather than to address questions of equal protec-
tion. 10 Up to this time, the plaintiffs paid little attention to Loving. 11 During 
the pleadings below, the local ACLU filed an amicus brief that equated 
9. The Baehr case has involved two events at the trial level and two at the appellate level. 
The frrst round, from 1991 to 1994, proceeded under the name Baehr v. Lewin. References to these 
documents either appear with the trial-level case number, No. 91-1394-05, or with the docket number 
No. 15689, if they were submitted in connection with the frrst appeal to the Hawaii Supreme Court. 
In 1995, with the replacement of the Director of the Department of Health, the case was renamed 
Baehr v. Miike. References to trial-level documents also appear by the case number, No. 91-1394-05, 
and references to documents submitted as part of the second, currently pending appeal appear as No. 
20371, the docket number for Baehr v. Miike. 
10. See State's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 5, 29, Baehr v. Lewin (Haw. Cir. 
Ct. 1991) (No. 91-1394-05); Answering Brief of Defendant-Appellee John C. Lewin at 29, Baehr 
(Haw. Cir. Ct. 1991) (No. 91-1394-05) (discussing Loving solely in the context of the freedom to 
marry). On appeal in 1992, Loving was ignored by the only brief filed in support of the State. See 
Amicus Curiae Brief of Rutherford Institute of Hawaii, Baehr (Haw. 1992) (No. 15689). 
11. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings at 25, 27, Baehr v. Miike (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1991) (No. 91-1394-05); Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Opening Brief at 19, Baehr (Haw. 1992) (No. 15689); Plaintiffs-Appellants Reply Brief at 2, 7, 
Baehr (Haw. 1992) (No. 15689) (distinguishing the use of Loving in Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W. 2d 
185 (1971), from the present case, and citing Loving for the proposition that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has "rejected 'morality' as a basis to justify infringement of a privacy right or discrimination against 
a suspect class"). 
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racism and criticism of homosexuality. 12 But Judge Klein did not cite Lov-
ing in his opinion and order. 13 
As far as I can tell, the Loving analogy was first explicitly introduced 
into the case in the amicus brief submitted in 1992 to the Hawaii Supreme 
Court by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund. It was co-
authored by Kirk Cashmere, Lambda's local counsel in Honolulu, and 
Evan Wolfson, 14 a senior staff attorney at Lambda's headquarters in New 
York City. This brief argued that Virginia's law was based on a "long so-
cial history of defining marriage as intrinsically intraracial," and went on 
to claim that "the 'opposite sex' requirement burdening gay people's right 
to choose our life partners, like the analogous racial restriction in Loving, 
is unconstitutional."15 
The most dramatic example of the use of the Loving analogy came in 
Baehr v. Lewin, the landmark decision issued by a plurality of the Hawaii 
Supreme Court on May 5, 1993.16 In contrast to the use of Loving in the 
pleadings below, the plurality opinion in Baehr ignored Loving in its due 
process analysis. Indeed, the plurality agreed with the dissent (and implic-
itly with the concurrence) that there was no fundamental right to same-sex 
marriage at all under the due process or right to privacy provisions of the 
Hawaii State Constitution. 17 
12. See Memorandum of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Hawaii 
Foundation in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 12, Baehr (Haw. 
Cir. Ct. 1991) (No. 91-1394-05) ("Of course, the use of 'scientific' evidence to rationalize prejudice 
is not unique to homosexuals. The accentuated racism of American [sic] in the first half of the 
twentieth century was often justified by a scientific theory that influenced both popular culture and 
academic thought and writing."). However, Loving was only cited for the proposition that marriage 
is a fundamental right. See /d. In its brief before the Hawaii Supreme Court in 1992, the ACLU did 
not cite to Loving. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Baehr (Haw. 1992) (No. 15689). 
13. See Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Baehr (Haw. Cir. 
Ct. 1991) (No. 91-1394-05). 
14. After the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in 1993, Wolfson would become co-counsel 
in the Baehr case. He also serves as Director of the Lambda-sponsored Marriage Project. See, e.g., 
Evan Wolfson, A Truly National Civil Rights Movement: Marriage Project Director's Update, NEWS 
& VIEWS (October 1, 1997) (visited on April 22, 1998) <http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/ 
documents/record?record=42>. 
15. Brief of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., at I, 3 , Baehr 
(Haw. 1992) (No. 15689). The Lambda brief made both a due process and equal protection 
argument. /d. Their equal protection claim, however, was based on "sexual orientation" as a suspect 
class, rather than on "sex," which was the later innovation offered by the Hawaii Supreme Court 
itself. !d. 
16. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The Court's plurality opinion has been 
described by a prominent legal scholar as one of the ten worst state supreme court decisions in 
American history. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A BOOK OF LEGAL LISTS: THE BEST AND WORST IN 
AMERICAN LAw 182-84 (1997) (calling the reasoning in the second half of the plurality opinion "an 
affront to both law and language that well deserves its place on the list of worst decisions"). 
17. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57 (plurality opinion), 70 (Heen, J ., dissenting). In his concurrence, 
Judge Burns did not contest the due process holding, but focused on what he considered "genuine 
issues of material fact" relevant to equal protection analysis. /d. at 68-70 (Burns, J .. concurring) 
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Instead, taking a page from Lambda's play book, the plurality adopted 
the Loving analogy as part of its equal protection analysis. In their narra-
tive of Loving, Justices Levinson and Moon set the U.S. Supreme Court 
against the Virginia courts. On one side was Loving v. Virginia, based on 
the Fourteenth Amendment's antipathy to "individious discrimination" 
based on "racial classifications," regardless of what form they took. 18 On 
the other side were the Virginia Courts, exemplified by Loving v. Com-
monwealth/9 committed to the unholy trio of (1) appeals to Divine Will, 
(2) appeals to "custom," and (3) the use of a formalistic theory of "equal 
application. "20 
The Attorney General of Hawaii, however, had made no appeals to 
Divine Will, so the court's heavy emphasis on the Virginia trial court's 
diatribe was apparently gratuitous. Perhaps the plurality meant to attack 
the very idea that anything could be intrinsically natural or unnatural. If so, 
it could then have applied that approach to its views about "couples" and 
"civil liberties." Indeed, it could have deconstructed the very idea of the 
individual. But it stopped with marriage. So far as Justice Levinson and 
Chief Justice Moon were concerned, the State's appeals to custom and 
equal application were as faulty as those made thirty years earlier by the 
State of Virginia in the defense of racism. Just as the Lovings were dis-
criminated against based upon their race, the Baehr plurality contended, 
the three plaintiff couples were being discriminated against based on their 
sex. 21 In two now-classic quotes, the Baehr plurality put the issue in the 
following terms. 
With all due respect to the Virginia courts of a bygone era, we 
do not believe that trial judges are the ultimate authorities on 
the subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving amply demonstrates, 
constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that customs 
change with an evolving social order.22 
Therefore, in the words of the second quote, "substitution of 'sex' for 
'race' in Article I, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment yields the pre-
cise case before us together with the conclusion that we have reached."23 
(arguing that due process hinges on whether people are "biologically fated" for a particular sexual 
orientation). 
18. /d. at 62. 
19. Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966). 
20. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 62, 67-68. 
21. /d. at 63. The plurality and dissent both ignored the plaintiffs' claim that the marriage 
statute discriminated on the basis of "sexual orientation." Judge Burns, in his concurrence, only 
addressed the issue in the context of his question whether "sexual orientation" should be included 
in the term "sex." ld at 68-70 (Burns, J., concurring). 
22. /d. at 63. 
23. /d. at 68. 
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In his dissent, Judge Heen was not impressed by this analogy. "Lov-
ing, " he replied, "is simply not authority for the plurality's proposition that 
the civil right to marriage must be accorded to same sex couples."24 Echo-
ing arguments that had been made before, and have been made since, Heen 
argued that Loving was a case about race, not analogous to a case about 
same-sex couples. Because the Hawaii marriage law is equally open to 
both sexes, it is therefore not parallel to the so-called "equal application" 
theory advanced by Virginia. The rationales were not parallel, he insisted, 
because while the Virginia law was based on invidious racial discrimina-
tion, the Hawaii law is not based upon invidious sex discrimination. 25 In-
stead, the Hawaii law was based on the nature of the institution of mar-
riage. Judge Heen did not invoke Divine Will; nor did he invoke custom, 
in the sense of mere convention. Instead, he made a definitional argument, 
drawing upon Singer v. Hara, a key decision from the State of Washing-
ton, which had addressed the question of sex-based classifications: 
[A]ppellants are not being denied entry into the marriage rela-
tionship because of their sex; rather, they are being denied 
entry into the marriage relationship because of the recognized 
definition of that relationship as one which may be entered 
into only by two persons who are members of the opposite 
sex. 26 
Heen insisted that this was not a circular argument, but simply a true de-
scription of marriage. The plurality, not surprisingly, rejected this "exer-
cise in tortured and conclusory sophistry.'m In response to Heen's argu-
ments, they simply quoted back from the text of the Loving decision. Here 
we see how the Loving analogy becomes less of a legal argument, and 
more of a powerful political weapon. The plurality was directly comparing 
Judge Heen to the Virginiajudges.28 
In its Motion for Reconsideration, filed shortly after the initial decision 
in Baehr v. Lewin, the State attacked the plurality's use of Loving. First, it 
drew the following contrast between Virginia's and Hawaii's laws: In Vir-
ginia, interracial couples were also forbidden to cohabit. In Hawaii, on the 
other hand, same-sex couples are free to cohabit, make private contractual 
promises, and receive recognition from established formal or informal so-
cial institutions. 29 
24. /d. at 70 (Heen, J., dissenting). 
25. "The statute treats everyone alike and applies equally to both sexes." /d. at 71 n.3. 
26. /d. at 71 (quoting Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)). 
27. /d. at 63. 
28. This would have been especially insulting to Judge Heen, who is native Hawaiian. 
29. See Memorandum in Support of Appellee's Motion for Reconsideration, or, In the 
Alternative, for Clarification, and Suggestion of the Appropriateness of Rebriefing and Reargument 
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Second, the State argued that the "basic civil right" to marry identified 
in Loving-the right, in Loving's words, pertaining to our "existence and 
survival" - was based on a heterosexual definition of marriage.30 "Only 
those who are blind to reality," the Attorney General argued, "could read 
the precedents which define the 'freedom to marry' and to find that 'mar-
riage' to a person of one's own sex is 'fundamental to our very existence 
and survival.' "31 The view that marriage is "a mere state-endorsed partner-
ship [is] nothing but 'tortured and conclusory sophistry,"32 throwing the 
plurality's words back at them. The plurality responded by reaffirming 
their decision and remanding it to the lower court for a trial. 33 
The case, renamed Baehr v. Miike, finally came to trial in 1996. Dan 
Foley, the plaintiffs' lead counsel, invoked Loving eloquently in his open-
ing and closing statements.34 Loving was not an issue in the trial, however, 
and was only briefly discussed in the post-trial documents submitted by the 
parties.35 While it was invoked in a number of the trial-level amicus briefs 
submitted by organizations on both sides,36 Judge Chang's trial court opin-
at 16, Baehr (Haw. 1993) (No. 15689). 
30. Id. at 19. 
31. /d. at 18. 
32. /d. 
33. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 74-75 (Haw. 1993) (granting the motion in part. in 
order to reiterate its "strict scrutiny" mandate, denying the request for reargument, and remanding 
the case for trial). 
34. In addition to news stories about the trial in the HONOLULU STAR-BULL. and the 
HoNOLULU ADVERTISER, my own firsthand observations can be found at: David Orgon Coolidge, 
Marriage on Trial: Leaving It to the Experts?, HAW. CArn. HERALD, Sept. 20, 1996, at 1; Marriage 
on Trial: Who is the Judge?, HAW. CATH. HERALD, Oct. 4, 1996, at 22. 
35. See Plaintiffs' Post Trial Memorandum at 52-53, Baehr (No. 91-1394-05) (Oct. 25, 1996) 
(reminding the trial judge of the standard of scrutiny, using a lengthy Loving quote from the Baehr 
plurality opinion); Defendant State of Hawaii's Post Trial Brief at 6, Baehr (No. 91-1394-05) (Oct. 
25, 1996) (complaining that "the plaintiffs have unfairly compared the State's position in this case 
to the position of the State of Virginia in Loving," affirming the original holding in Loving, and 
arguing that the two cases can be distinguished: "The evil of the marriage prohibition in Loving was 
that the law sought to continue artificially segregating races. Whereas, in this case the sexes are not 
separated, neither sex is burdened relative to the other, and in fact the law only bans marriage where 
one sex is excluded"). 
36. Loving was invoked in trial-level briefs by a number of amici. See Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders; National Center for Lesbian Rights; NOW Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, Inc.; National Organization for Women, Inc.; National Organization 
for Women Foundation, Inc., In Support of Appellees at 6, Baehr (No. 91-1394-05) (drawing an 
analogy between recognition of interracial marriages and anticipated recognition of same-sex 
marriages); Brief of the Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant at 6, Baehr (No. 91-1394-05) (filed 
by Representatives Abinsay, Kahikina, Kanoho, Meyer, Stegmaier, Swain, Cachola, and Ward, with 
the assistance of the American Center for Law and Justice) (quoting Loving on marriage as 
"fundamental to our very existence and survival," and citing it for the proposition that opposite-sex 
marriages "are the building blocks of democratic society"); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American 
Friends Service Committee in Support of Plaintiffs at 1, 4, Baehr (No. 91-1394-05) (emphasizing 
the Hawaii Supreme Court's use of Loving, and drawing numerous parallels to discrimination against 
African-Americans); Trial Brief of Amicus Curiae Japanese American Citizens League-Honolulu 
Chapter at 5-8, Baehr (No. 91-1394-05) (rehearsing the Hawaii Supreme Court's use of Loving and 
arguing that "[t]he court must, as a matter of law, view the arguments of the Defendant with the 
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ion of December 3, 1996 ignored it. 37 The debate about Loving has contin-
ued in the briefs filed in the pending appeal before the Hawaii Supreme 
Court. The State argues that Loving "proceeded from the premise, not 
present in this case, that the classification at issue employed a suspect crite-
rion." It also claims that while the law at issue in Loving clearly discrimi-
nated in favor of whites and against blacks, in contrast, "Hawaii's mar-
riage law has neither the purpose nor the effect of discriminating against 
either women or men. To the contrary, its purpose and effect are to treat 
men and women as co-equal partners, each a necessary part of the un-
ion."38 The plaintiffs defend the Hawaii Supreme Court's original use of 
Loving, while using it to take aim at the State: "Apparently, the Director 
would have this court embrace the logic of the Virginia Supreme Court." 
"This court," they add, "should decline the Director's invitation to turn 
back the clock."39 This is nothing but "playing the Loving card." The 
plaintiffs call the Hawaii Supreme Court to a supposedly nobler mission, 
explicitly recalling the earlier struggles against anti-miscegenation laws: 
"One state had to show leadership, and the court was properly asked to 
provide it through a direct and timely challenge to existing discrimination. 
The court did not flinch. History has upheld it."40 Similar attacks were 
made by amici on the Attorneys General of other states filing in support of 
the State of Hawaii.41 
same level of strict scrutiny as if the Defendant was attempting to perpetuate a statute that was 
racially discriminatory on its face") (emphasis in original). 
37. See Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394 (Dec. 3, 1996), reprinted in 23 FAM. L. REP. 2001 
(Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996). On Dec. 4, Judge Chang orally agreed to stay his injunction, and formalized 
this in writing shortly thereafter. See Order Granting Defendant State of Hawaii's Motion to Stay 
Injunction Pending Appeal Filed on December 3, 1996, Baehr (No. 91-1394-05). The case is pending 
on appeal as Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371 (1997). For contrasting legal assessments of the trial, 
compare Sanmel A. Marcosson, The Lesson of the Same-Sex Marriage Trial: The Importance of 
Pushing Opponents of Lesbian and Gay Rights to Their "Second Line of Defense," 35 U. 
LoUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 721 (1996-97) with Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact on Homosexual 
Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 884-91. 
38. Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief at 17-20, Baehr (No. 20371). See also Defendant-
Appellant's Reply Brief at 5, Baehr (No. 20371) ("Moreover, plaintiffs have no answer to the fact 
that unlike the law challenged in Loving, which was rooted in notions of the inferiority of blacks, 
Hawaii's marriage law is not based upon any notion of the inferiority of females (or males)."). 
39. Plaintiffs-Appellees' Answering Brief at 21-23, Baehr (No. 20371). In the plaintiffs' 
words, "[s]ubstituting 'sex' for 'race' and 'women and men' for 'the white and the Negro,' you 
have, of course, the identical argument made by the [Hawaii] Director [of Health]." /d. at 22-23. 
40. /d. at 34. 
41. Compare Brief of Amici Curiae In Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Gay and Lesbian 
Advocates & Defenders, NOW, NOW Foundation, NOW Legal Defense & Education Fund, National 
Center for Lesbian Rights, NW Women's Law Center, People for the American Way, Asian-
American Legal Defense & Education Fund, Mexican-American Legal Defense & Education Fund 
at 4, n.2, Baehr (No. 20371) with Brief of Amici Curiae States of Nebraska, Alabama, California, 
Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina and South Dakota in 
Support of the Defendant-Appellant, Baehr (No. 20371) ("Eleven States [support Hawaii]'s position 
that the Hawaii Constitution may not accord rights to its citizens that may be objectionable to some 
other states .... With the exception of Michigan, a mere fifty years ago each of these States could 
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C. The Political Debate about the Analogy 
Between the court's bombshell opinion in 1993 and the case's second 
arrival to the court in mid-1997, the use of the Loving analogy shifted to 
other venues in Hawaii. Between 1993 and 1997, the message of supposed 
equivalence between interracial and same-sex marriage was preached re-
lentlessly in newspaper editorials, columns by activists, and legislative 
speeches. 
Both major Hawaii newspapers have openly supported same-sex mar-
riage from the beginning. Within a week after the Baehr decision, the Ho-
NOLULU ADVERTISER had this to say about the issue: 
By granting license [sic] to marry to gays and lesbians, will 
Hawaii go beyond tolerance to officially sanctioning (and in-
deed rewarding) a relationship outside the norm of the stan-
dards of the majority of the community? The answer, today, is 
yes. Yet society's standards are constantly evolving. There was 
a time not long ago when most states had laws against mar-
riage between persons of different races.42 
Several weeks later, after the supreme court rejected the State's Motion for 
Reconsideration, the HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN was even more blunt. 
"The battle for acceptance and equal rights for gays isn't over by a long 
shot," it announced. "Many Americans still consider homosexuality to be 
immoral and a form of mental illness." The paper was not subtle in how it 
characterized these Americans: "Fear and ignorance have long been the 
enemies of sound public policy. Ethnic cleansers, Ku Klux Klansmen, fas-
cists and witch burners have used them to deny people life, liberty and 
happiness throughout history."43 
The drumbeat continued throughout the 1994 legislative session, in-
side and outside of the state capitol. In April, when the legislature passed a 
bill in response to the Baehr decision, legislators supportive of same-sex 
unions began "playing the Loving card." "I've heard the argument that 
there is no discrimination because members of both genders are equally 
forbidden from marrying anyone of the same gender," said Senator Matt 
Matsunaga on the floor of the Senate. "But similar arguments failed to 
save the laws against inter-racial marriage in which everyone was equally 
forbidden to marry anyone of a different race. Parallel discriminations are 
have made these same arguments about interracial marriage. By the time of the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia, the states of Alabama, Georgia, Missouri, Mississippi and 
South Carolina outlawed interracial marriage."). 
42. Editorial, Gay tiUlrriage: Moving beyond tolerance, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, May 9, 1993, 
at B2. 
43. Gay marriage decision is a civil rights victory, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., May 31, 1993. 
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still, nonetheless, discrirninations."44 In response, Senator Stan Koki shot 
back: "This is not an issue about civil rights. Blacks and minorities have 
suffered economic hardship. They've been treated as second class - in 
the back of the bus, separate bathrooms. None of this applies here in this 
case. "45 The final text of the bill included a lengthy discussion of Loving in 
its opening section, and explicitly rejected the Loving analogy. This pro-
voked one Representative to compare the bill to discriminatory Jim Crow 
laws.46 
This pattern of attack was also displayed to great effect in the 1995 
Report of the Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law.47 The 
Chairman of the Commission, Thomas P. Gill, was a member of the Board 
of Directors of the local ACLU, and a strong supporter of same-sex mar-
riage.48 The Majority Report spent a full four pages discussing Loving, of-
fering analogies to the same-sex marriage debate. The opponents of same-
sex marriage, they charged, were making the same kinds of arguments that 
had been made thirty years earlier: appeals to religion, morality and public 
health; unwillingness to recognize existing relationships; unwarranted 
fears of economic disruption; concerns about children; and appeals to pub-
lic opinion. "The Commission favors the belief of John F. Kennedy: 'If we 
cannot end our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for 
diversity.' "49 The minority opinion, however, challenged the Majority's 
caricature of their position, and challenged the Loving analogy as well.50 
44. 1994 SENATE JOURNAL 450 (Haw.). Senator Andrew Levin seconded his point: "I have 
a very difficult time distinguishing between the Loving decision in 1967, which said that inter-racial 
marriages cannot be prohibited .... The situation hasn't changed. And now we face a very. very 
similar issue with respect to same-sex couples." /d. at 451. Their colleague, the late Senator Richard 
Matsuura, also spoke at some length about his experiences with racial prejudice as a young man in 
Georgia. However, he voted in favor of the bill for other reasons. /d. at 447. 
45. /d. at 450. Shortly thereafter, Senator Rick Reed added: "It is offensive to equate 
homosexual behavior with ethnicity, as some members of this body and other[s] have done in their 
attempt to make the homosexual campaign for minority status, and the special rights this nation 
affords minorities, comparable to the civil rights movement on behalf of Blacks and other legitimate 
minorities in our country." /d. at 452. 
46. 1994 HAW. SESS. LAWS 217 (Relating to Marriage). Representative Cynthia Thielen 
compared it to supporting Japanese American internments and segregation: "As a child, I visited the 
Deep South with my mother. In a store, I walked up to a drinking fountain to get a drink. A man 
rushed over and told me I couldn't use that drinking fountain. When I asked why, because I was 
thitsty, he said it was for 'coloreds only.' And then I saw the sign above the fountain - 'colored' -
and the other fountain with a sign above it, saying 'whites'. Hawaii's Supreme Court will tell us if 
we today have enacted a 'whites only' law - and this is the proper role for the Court." She too voted 
for the bill. 1994 HOUSE JOURNAL 655-56 (Haw.). 
47. See LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF HAWAII, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (Dec. 8, 1995). The official two-page summary of the 
Commission Report stated that "the reasons advanced by those who support this denial [of same-sex 
marriage licenses] show a close parallel to the landmark case of Loving v. Virginia." /d. at iii. 
48. See id. at 194 appendix F-2 (citing Coalition Forms To Support Same-Sex Marriage and 
Oppose State Constitutional Amendment (ACLU Press Release), Oct. 27, 1993). 
49. /d. at 29. 
50. See id. at 47. The minority opinion stated: "The majority's argument relies on the tenuous 
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The majority responded in a condescending tone to the minority: "The Mi-
nority apparently thinks our Supreme Court was misguided when it cited 
Loving. The majority agrees with the Supreme Court."51 
In particular, "the Loving card" was played during the 1996 and 1997 
legislative sessions, in an effort to stop a proposed amendment in the Ha-
waii Constitution. During this period, the Loving analogy was invoked in 
at least seven editorials in the HONOLULU ADVERTISER and HONOLULU 
STAR-BULLETIN. 52 In one case, when the ADVERTISER published a dissent-
ing view by the late Rex E. Lee, former Solicitor General of the United 
States, it felt compelled to attack him directly in the same section. "Con-
sider what the results would have been if a constitutional ban on interracial 
marriages had been proposed in the deep South before the civil rights era," 
it hissed. "Of course it would have passed. And of course it would have 
been wrong."53 With that, the former Solicitor General's well-reasoned 
beliefs were slandered with the brush of bigotry. 
When the proposed constitutional amendment came to the Hawaii 
House floor for third reading in early 1997, Representative Ed Case made 
an impassioned speech against it. In words that some might call eloquent, 
and others might call inflammatory, he made the following set of analo-
gies: 
So, to the black children of Arkansas in the early 1950s, whom 
the majority didn't want to attend white schools, this no vote is 
for you. To the Japanese-American internees of World War II, 
who should have been protected by our Constitution from rna-
assumption that the present legal status of gay marriages parallels the laws against interracial 
marriages in the 1960s . . . Race and gender are immutable characteristics. Clearly, sexual 
orientation is not in the same category-sexual orientation is known to change and is, to a large 
extent. behavioral .... Homosexual marital rights are simply not civil rights." !d. 
51. !d. at 101 (majority response to minority opinion). The majority also stated, "[t]he 
opposition to interracial marriage (called miscegenation) was as emotional and passionate in the 
1960's as the opposition to same-gender marriage now. Many of the same reasons, including 
destruction of existing society, were given then as they are now. The Loving case did not cause the 
collapse of society in Virginia or elsewhere, and the arguments now seem ridiculous, particularly in 
Hawaii." !d. 
52. Editorial, Legislators Hold Cards in Gay Marriage Issue, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Jan. 
24, 1997, (viewed on April 22, 1998) <http://starbulletin.com/97/01/24/editoriallindex.htrnl>; Editorial, 
Preparing for Battle on Same-Sex Marriage, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Nov. 13, 1997, (viewed on 
April 22, 1998) <http://starbulletin.com/97/ll/13/editoriallindex.htmi>; Editorial, Same-Sex Marriage: 
Don't Amend the Constitution, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Mar. 3, 1996, at B2; Editorial, Same-Sex 
Marriage Foes are Struggling, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Apr. 13, 1996, at B2; Editorial, Same-Sex 
Marriage Issue far From Settled, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Dec. 5, 1996, at A18; Editorial, Same-Sex 
Marriage: Public Opinion vs. the Law, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Feb. 24, 1996, (viewed on April 
22, 1998) <http://starbulletin.com/97/ll/13/editoriallindex.htmi>; Editorial, Same-Sex Marriage: Public 
Opinion vs. the Law, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Apr. 6, 1996, at A6 (same title as previous editorial, 
but different text). 
53. Same-Sex Marriage: Don't Amend the Constitution, supra note 52. (responding to Rex 
E. Lee, Same-sex unions: Let Voters Decide, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Mar. 3, 1996, at B3). 
214 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 12 
jority America, but at least had a Constitution from which to 
seek protection, this no vote is for you. To all of the interracial 
couples of the past, present and future, whom the majority 
didn't want to marry, this no vote is for you .... To those who 
fear the rise of the thought police and the drive to homogenize 
a country and state whose greatest strengths are their diver-
sity, this no vote is for you. To all of the minorities of the past, 
and to those minorities of the future whose circumstances we 
cannot even imagine today, this no vote is for you. This no vote 
is for us all. 54 
In the face of such strident attacks, the Reverend Marc Alexander, Execu-
tive Director of the Hawaii Catholic Conference offered the following re-
sponse on behalf of his fellow citizens: 
Our Aloha State has been in turmoil since the Hawaii State 
Supreme Court decision in Baehr v. Miike in May of 1993 
which forced the issue of 'same-sex marriage' into the public 
forum. The public discourse which has transpired has helped 
the people of Hawaii realize how important the institution of 
marriage really is. In 1991 some 49% of the people of Hawaii 
opposed 'same-sex marriage.' As of last year, that figure had 
increased to almost 75% of the people of Hawaii, a people 
known for their 'aloha' and tolerance. In fact, just last week 
some 7,000 people rallied in a very dignified and respectful 
way in favor of traditional marriage. The people who gathered 
came from across our state. We were ordinary people, normally 
silent, young and old, married and single, from every ethnic 
group in Hawaii, religious and non-religious. Looking at the 
masses I couldn't help but think that this group had nothing in 
common except that Hawaii is our home and we are convinced 
that marriage should not be redefined. The 75% of the people 
who want marriage to be marriage can hardly be compared to 
Southern white racists of the 50's and 60's or to religious big-
ots. No, we just want what is best for our community and our 
children. And we want our right and power to determine pub-
lic policy returned to us. We approved our State Constitution 
and we have the right to change it. 55 
54. 1997 HOUSE JOURNAL 119 (Haw.). 
55. Testimony of Father Mark Alexander, Executive Director of the Hawaii Catholic 
Conference (Feb. 3, 1997) (viewed on April 22, 1998) <http://www.pono.neUpo1icy/samesex-
marriage/t960127w.html>. Other testimony of the Hawaii Catholic Conference spanning the length 
of tbe debate in Hawaii can be found at this website. 
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Nevertheless, the rhetorical onslaught continued. Senator A very 
Chumbley, co-chair of the Hawaii Senate Judiciary Committee, expressed 
sentiments similar to those of Representative Case when the final text of 
the Amendment came to the Senate floor several months later: 
Apart from the constitution itself, I believe that America's 
commitment to fairness and quality is best captured in the 
words of Dr. Martin Luther King, 'I have a dream,' he said, 
'that some day my children will be judged not by the color of 
their skin but rather by the content of their character.' And as 
legislators, it is a daily challenge that we make real this dream 
and to ensure that distinctions imposed by the law are based 
on genuine and substantial governmental interests and not 
based on fear, ignorance, or prejudice.56 
Senator Chumbley gave some indication of what he meant by "fear, igno-
rance, or prejudice" by stating: 
Most of the opposition to same-sex marriage and reciprocal 
benefits came from persons who stated that they were so moti-
vated by strong religious beliefs. I understand that religious 
beliefs compel some people to oppose same-sex marriage be-
cause these relationships involve what some consider aberrant 
and deviant sexual behavior. I struggled in talking with these 
persons who were sometimes ill-informed and, unfortunately, 
responding from fear rather than from a place of tolerance and 
understanding .... In the end, I am willing to acknowledge 
that political pressure was brought and bought by persons 
both within and outside of Hawaii, which allowed for the 'ma-
jority' to be able to overrule the minority. 57 
It is little wonder, then, that in the Hawaii House Chamber, on that same 
day, Representative Gene Ward made a speech in support of the Marriage 
Amendment that reflected his clear understanding of the dynamics of the 
situation, and the politics of the Loving analogy: "Using Judge Levinson's 
logic in the Loving case and the compelling State interest by which it was 
framed, Mr. Speaker, it's tantamount to me asking you do you still beat 
your wife. "58 
In short, while the positive formulation of the Loving analogy has ap-
peared from time to time, when the pressure is on, it is the accusation of 
"no better than Jim Crow" that gets thrown into the debate. When the de-
bate grows fierce, the argument takes on a razor's edge. Consider, for in-
56. 1997 SENATE JOURNAL at 766 (Haw. 1997). 
57. /d. Senator Chumbley, by the way, voted in support of the proposed Amendment. 
58. 1997 HOUSE JOURNAL 920 (Haw.). 
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stance, the meaning of radio and TV ads aired in 1997 with the following 
set of images: 
(1) Japanese-Americans being forced into internment camps, 
(2) dramatic footage from marches during the civil rights move-
ment, and then 
(3) a message: "Threatens the rights of all."59 
The clear message is that preserving marriage under existing law is no dif-
ferent than imprisoning or attacking ethnic minorities. This is not a legal 
argument but simply "playing the Loving card." 
Ironically, this message has been broadcast to the same citizens who 
live, day by day, at work, in neighborhoods, in religious communities, and 
in the public square alongside neighbors who call themselves "gay" and 
"lesbian." Most of these citizens of Hawaii are able both to support the 
existing marriage law and still respect their neighbors. Despite this nega-
tive media campaign-or perhaps because of it-seventy percent of citi-
zens of Hawaii continue to oppose the legalization of "same-sex mar-
riage," especially if it is forced upon them by the judiciary. 60 At this point, 
when the rubber of progressive legal theory hits the road of public argu-
ment, much of what has been grandly theorized about in the academy co-
mes to a screeching halt. Even with the ACLU out spending their oppo-
nents two to-one, the proposed constitutional amendment passed the legis-
lature, and will go before the voters of Hawaii on November 3, 1998.61 
The citizens of Hawaii can count on seeing more propaganda during the 
coming year.62 
59. See, for example, television ad aired on KGMB-TV, Apr. 20, 1996, at 6:19 P.M. The 
message was prepared by the Coalition for Equality and Diversity, an ACLU-sponsored group. 
60. See, e.g., Robbie Dingeman, Most Residents Still Against Same-Sex Unions, Poll Finds, 
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Nov. 5, 1997, at Al4 ("The poll found that 69 percent favored 'traditional' 
male-female marriage, while 23 percent said that same-sex marriages should be allowed. Another 8 
percent didn't know or refused to say."); Voters Strongly Oppose Gay Unions, HONOLULU STAR-
BULL., Feb. 24, 1997, (viewed April 22, 1998) <http://starbulletin.com/97/02/24/news/story2.html> 
("[S]entiments about legalizing same-gender marriage essentially remain the same as a year ago, with 
70 percent of respondents saying they were against it."). 
61. The proposed Marriage Amendment, which would become Article I, Section 23 of the 
Hawaii State Constitution, reads as follows: "The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage 
to opposite-sex couples." H.B. 117, 19th Leg. (Haw. 1997) (enacted). On April 29, 1997, the 
proposed Marriage Amendment was approved by the Senate with 25 Ayes and 0 Nays, 1997 SENATE 
JOURNAL 766 (Haw.), and in the House with 44 Ayes, 6 Nays, and I Excused. 1997 HousE 
JOURNAL 922 (Haw.). See David Orgon Coolidge, At Last, Hawaiians Have Their Say on Gay 
Marriage, WAt.L STREET JOURNAl., Apr. 23, 1997, at Al9. 
62. According to Elizabeth Birch, executive director of the Washington, D.C. based Human 
Rights Campaign (HRC), "This is a fight of historic proportions." Peter Freiberg, Gay Groups 
Preparing to Wage War in Hawaii, WASHINGTON BLADE, June 20, 1997, at 23. HRC and other 
national gay and lesbian rights groups are working closely with the local organization opposing the 
Marriage Amendment, Marriage-Project Hawaii. /d. A new organization has been formed to oppose 
the Amendment, called Save Our Constitution. HRC has hired former state legislator Jacke Young 
as a consultant for the campaign. Aloha Nuptials, WASHINGTON BLADE, Feb. 6, 1998, at 16. On 
the other side, a new organization, Save Traditional Marriage-'98 (STM), has been formed to 
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D. The Power and Purchase of the Analogy 
What, then, can be said in summary about the power and purchase of 
the Loving analogy, as it appears on the ground in Hawaii where the mar-
riage debate has gone the furthest? It would appear that the Loving analogy 
is not so much an argument about heterosexism, since that is a complex 
argument more suited to legal conferences than to radio and television pro-
paganda. Instead, it has been used as a blunt instrument to achieve certain 
goals, among them (1) claiming the moral high ground of civil rights, and 
(2) intimidating and shaming one's opposition and the general public. This 
has been done not by offering legal arguments, but by projecting emotional 
images and associations. The goal of playing "the Loving card" is to soften 
up the public, so it will not mobilize. After all, the plaintiffs, their attor-
neys, and the organizations advancing their campaign win if the public 
does nothing. The advocates are not trying to convince the public of any-
thing, except to stay home. By definition, they are trying to circumvent the 
democratic process and achieve their results through the anti-majoritarian 
courts. 
Ill. PROBLEMS WITH THE LOVING ANALOGY 
There are some facts, however, which do not fit neatly into the claimed 
analogy between Loving and Baehr. Indeed, it can be argued that the two 
issues, and cases, are fundamentally different. 
A. States and Statutes 
First, perhaps the most striking difference is a comparison of the two 
states under discussion. The State of Virginia was a hotbed of racial polar-
ization in virtually every area of social life. While Virginia had a substan-
tial African-American population, the power elites in Virginia were over-
whelmingly white.63 Long after other states had repealed their anti-misce-
campaign for the passage of the Maniage Amendment. Its Co-Chairs are Diane Ho Kurtz, executive 
vice-president of Hawaii Biotechnology Group, Inc., and Bill Paul, former Chairman of the Hawaii 
Chamber of Commerce and the Hawaii Visitors Bureau. Before the fight is over, millions of dollars 
will probably be poured into the campaign. See Mike Yuen, New Isle PAC Hopes to Derail Gay 
Marriages: A Hawaii Constitution Amendment Would Give Legislators the Power, HoNOLULU STAR-
BULL., Nov. 12, 1997, at AI. 
63. It hardly needs comment, but white dominance is obvious from the campaign launched 
in support of the anti-miscegenation law in the 1920s; the Massive Resistance against the U.S. 
Supreme Court's Brown decision; the State's open warfare against the NAACP; and the Supreme 
Court of Appeals' decision in Nairn v. Nairn. See ROBERT A. PRATT, THE COLOR OF THEIR SKIN: 
EDUCATION AND RACE IN RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, 1954-89 (1992) (on Massive Resistance); MARK V. 
TuSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAw: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, 
at 247-51, 272-82 (1994) (on Massive Resistance and the attack on the NAACP); Paul A. Lombardo, 
Miscegenation, Eugenics, and Racism: Historical Footnotes to Loving v. Virginia, 21 U.C. DAVIS 
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genation laws, the State of Virginia was among those Southern States 
holding on to the bitter end.64 
In contrast, Hawaii is probably the only state in which whites--or 
haoles----constitute less than a majority. For this reason, supporters of 
"same-sex marriage" expected Hawaii to be sympathetic to their cause. 65 
To be sure, Hawaii is hardly a hotbed of "anti-gay" sentiment, either in its 
culture or in its laws. Quite the contrary, Hawaii considers itself far more 
tolerant and "progressive" than the rest of the country when it comes to 
same-sex couples. And so it is, both before and after Baehr. 66 Before the 
1993 plurality opinion in Baehr, however, neither Hawaii nor other States 
showed any sign of seriously debating their definitions of marriage. Indeed 
in other states, the question of marriage had been taken off the table by gay 
and lesbian legal strategists. 67 
L. REv. 421, 422-25 (1988) (on the campaign for the anti-miscegenation statute); Robert A. Pratt, 
Crossing the Color Line: An Historical Assessment and Personal Narrative of Loving v. Virginia, 
41 How. L.J. (forthcoming 1998); Gregory Michael Dorr, Principled Expediency: Eugenics, Nairn 
v. Nairn, and the Supreme Court (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (giving the 
full story of Nairn v. Nairn). 
64. See generally ROBERT SICKELS, RACE, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW (1972). 
65. According to the 1990 census, 61.8% of the population of Hawaii is "Asian or Pacific 
l~lander," 33.4 % is "Caucasian," and the remaining 5% of residents are "black," "American Indiana, 
Eskimo or Aleut," or "Other". See ANTHONY MICHAEL OLIVER, HAWAII FACT AND REFERENCE BOOK 
12 (1995). This diversity was triumphed by early commentators from the mainland as a likely source 
of support for "same-sex marriage". See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, No Fantasy Island: Gay Rites 
Gain Momentum in Hawaii," NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 7, 1995, at 23 ("The State is the most racially 
diverse in the U.S., and traditional Hawaiian culture is very tolerant of same-sex relationships."); Deb 
Price, Seeking the Right to Marry for Gay Couples, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Jan. 5, 1993, at Al2 
("[l]n Hawaii-known for its fruit salad of ethnic and racial groups and its privacy guarantees-gay 
couples are feeling lucky."). But see Dingeman, supra note 60; Voters Strongly Oppose Gay Unions, 
supra note 60. 
66. For instance, in 1991 Hawaii added "sexual orientation" to the list of protected 
classifications under its fair employment statute. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 368-1, 378-1, 378-3 (1997). 
In addition, "Reciprocal Beneficiaries" (RB) legislation was passed during the 1997 legislative 
session. See 1997 HAW. SESS. LAws ch. 383. The RB law allows certain benefits previously limited 
to married couples to be extended to two individuals who are otherwise ineligible to marry. Unlike 
a domestic partnership statute, which would be intended to apply only to persons in an "intimate" 
(i.e. sexual) relationship, RBs can also be a parent and child, or two brothers, or two sisters, or two 
close friends. The two individuals need not live together, or even reside in Hawaii. Two days after 
the Governor allowed the bill to become law without his signature, it was challenged in court by a 
group of Hawaii employers. As of this writing, a consent decree has been entered that drastically 
narrows the scope of employers covered by the statute, and surprisingly few persons have signed up 
under the law. See Op. ATT'Y GEN., No. 97-05 (Haw. Aug. 14, 1997) (offering a narrower 
interpretation of the Act than some had expected); Hawaii's Domestic Partners Law a Bust, 
WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 25, 1997, at Al4 (updating the narrative, and reporting that while the 
State expected at least 20,000 people to sign up as RBs, only 5,000 individuals had obtained 
applications, and only 296 couples had officially registered with the State as of Dec. 10, 1997); 
Linda Hosek, Reciprocal Benefits Limited: A Deal Would Exempt Most Firms from Having to Pay 
Health Benefits, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Sept. 26, 1997, (viewed April 22, 1998) 
<http://starbulletin.com/97/09/26/news/ storyl.html> (describing the proposed consent decree). 
67. See EsKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 7, at 57 ("The issue of 
gay marriage was impaled on these failures to make any legal headway. Lacking success in the 
marriage forum, lawyers and activists concentrated their energies on issues for which there were 
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One can also see differences in the marriage laws themselves. In Vir-
ginia, the anti-miscegenation law was partially a leftover from slavery, and 
partially the product of a zealous campaign by social scientists and helping 
professionals aimed at "improving" society.68 Under the anti-mis-
cegenation law, it was a felony if a white and a black person married each 
other. 69 
In Hawaii, in contrast, the marriage law is positive, not prohibitory. It 
was enacted under the Hawaiian Kingdom and, in this particular respect, 
has remained unchanged since statehood. In the state's words, "Section 
572-1 [the marriage statute] does not compel any action from homosexual 
couples. It imposes no penalties or other sanctions upon them. Their rela-
tionships are not disturbed in any manner by the law."70 In Hawaii, no one 
was charged with a felony; the State simply sent them a polite letter and 
returned their marriage applications.71 
This, of course, points out another crucial difference: The Lovings 
could be found guilty of a felony because there was somewhere else-right 
across the river-where they could marry.72 The anti-miscegenation laws 
were badges and incidents of slavery and products of eugenic social engi-
neers. In this respect, Southern anti-miscegenation laws ran counter to the 
Western tradition of marriage law. All one has to do is to look at any stan-
dard history of Western law, from Roman times to the present, to see that 
tangible legal successes."). Even after the Baehr case began, there was still reluctance on the part 
of national gay rights organizations to support it. See Paul M. Barrett, I Do/No You Don't: How 
Hawaii Became Ground Zero in Battle Over Gay Marriages, WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 17, 1996, 
at AI ("The Hawaii case was a big topic at the twice-yearly meetings of the Roundtable, a group 
of high-proftle gay and lesbian lawyers. 'We had arguments, discussions, debates, some very heated,' 
recounts Mr. Wolfson, a participant."). 
68. In the words of Phil Hirschkop, who participated in the oral argument before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, "These are slavery laws, pure and simple." Transcript of Oral Argument at 2, 
Loving (No. 395), reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
HIE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 961 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). 
On the link between anti-miscegenation laws and eugenics, see generally Paul A. Lombardo, 
Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 
13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y I (1996); Paul A. Lombardo, Miscegenation, Eugenics, and 
Racism: Historical Footnotes to Loving v. Virginia, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (1988). 
69. Virginia's anti-miscegenation law provided that, "If any white person intermarry with a 
colored person, or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony 
and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five 
years." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-59 (Michie 1950), quoted in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967). 
70. State's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 18, Baehr v. Miike, (No. 91-1394-05) 
(Haw. Cir. Ct. 1991). 
71. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44, 49-50 n.3 (providing history and text of the Department of Health 
letter to the plaintiffs rejecting their marriage applications). Hawaii's current policy is to put marriage 
licenses from same-sex couples on hold, pending the results of the Baehr litigation. See, i.e., Ruth 
Shiroma, Marriage Licenses Withheld from Homosexual Pair, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, June 18, 
1994. 
72. The Lovings married in Washington, D.C. in June, 1958. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 1, 2. 
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marriage has been understood to involve the union of a man and a 
woman. 73 
In contrast, there was no place, and is no place, for same-sex couples 
to go to get married. To legalize "same-sex marriage," marriage itself will 
first have to be redefined. 74 
B. Differences in Litigating: Activists, Plaintiffs and Lawyers 
There are other important differences between Loving and Baehr. 
These concern differences between the plaintiffs, the way in which the 
cases were launched, the interaction between plaintiffs, lawyers and inter-
est groups, and the public response to the decisions. 
Loving began quite differently than Baehr, and the differences are tell-
ing. No one "planned" the Loving case. Mildred and Richard Loving were 
not activists.75 They were an ordinary man and woman from rural Virginia, 
who grew up and fell in love in communities which were relatively tolerant 
of interracial couples. They did not begin by challenging Virginia's anti-
miscegenation laws; when they decided to marry, Richard knew about the 
Virginia statute, so they got married in 1958, in Washington, D.C. They 
then moved back to their community, thinking that their marriage was safe, 
but they were wrong. The Loving case began when someone tipped off the 
Caroline County Sheriff that Richard and Mildred had gotten married, and 
the sheriff arrested them. 
After being indicted by a grand jury, they pled guilty to violating Vir-
ginia's Racial Integrity Act. On January 6, 1959, Judge Leon Bazile sen-
tenced them to one year in jail. Judge Bazile agreed to suspend their sen-
tences, however, if they agreed not to reside together in Virginia as hus-
band and wife for a period of twenty-five years.76 In Professor Pratt's 
73. See for example, the excellent analysis by JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO 
CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (1997). The late John 
Boswell, in contrast, argued that same-sex unions were a recognized feature of early Christian 
tradition. See JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE (1994). His claims were 
bold, and widely broadcast, but they appear to have little basis. Even William Eskridge, who is 
generally enthusiastic about accounts of pre-modem same-sex unions, is less than confident about 
Boswell's conclusions: "It seems likely that the Church did sanction these brotherhood ceremonies 
and that there is some likelihood that the brothers so joined enjoyed relationships of affinity and 
erotic possibilities." EsKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 7, at 27. For more 
pointed critiques of Boswell's claims, see Brent D. Shaw, A Groom of One's Own? The Medieval 
Church and the Question of Gay Marriage, NEW REPUBLIC, July 1994, at 18-25, 33-38, 40-41; 
Robin Darling Young, Gay Marriage: Reimagining Church History, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1994, at 
43-48; and Constance Woods, Same-Sex Unions or Semantic Illusions?, COMMUNIO, Summer 1995, 
at 316. 
74. For a description and critical discussion of these proposed redefinitions, see Coolidge, 
supra note I, at 28-42. 
75. For a fuller narrative of the Loving family and the Loving case, see Pratt, supra note 63; 
SICKELS, supra note 3, at 76-110. 
76. Judge Bazile's opinion is printed in VIRGINIA BRIEFS AND RECORDS, No. 6163, Loving 
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words, "The Lovings paid their court fees of $36.29 each and moved to 
Washington, D.C., where they would spend their next five years in ex-
ile.'m 
"The Lovings had not really been that interested in the civil rights 
movement, nor had they ever given much thought to challenging Vir-
ginia's law," as Pratt notes.78 But during the 1963 debate over the civil 
rights bill, Mildred wrote a letter to U.S. Attorney General Robert Ken-
nedy, asking if there was any way in which their conviction could be over-
turned. When Kennedy received the letter, he forwarded it to the ACLU, 
and Bernard Cohen, a local Alexandria attorney, took the case on a pro 
bono basis. He and Philip J. Hirschkop filed a class action suit in U.S. Dis-
trict Court, challenging the constitutionality of the anti-miscegenation law. 
Throughout the process, the Lovings did everything they could to stay out 
of public view. They did not even attend the oral argument offered on their 
behalf at the United States Supreme Court.79 
Most civil rights organizations had deliberately avoided bringing law-
suits against anti-miscegenation laws. Their theory was that challenges to 
interracial marriage bans were politically toxic, and should therefore be 
strategically avoided, especially in the tense political atmosphere following 
Brown v. Board of Education. When the U.S. Supreme Court accepted 
Loving, however, the major civil rights groups easily coalesced, since they 
agreed on issues of principle. 80 
v. Commonwealth ( 1959). I thank Professor Pratt for unearthing this citation. 
77. Pratt, supra note 63 (manuscript at I 0). In 1963, when their attorneys filed suit 
challenging their sentence, the Lovings moved back to Virginia for the balance of their case. But 
between 1963 and 1967, they were in constant legal jeopardy. In Loving v. Commonwealth, the 
Virginia Supreme Court overturned the trial court's decision as "so unreasonable as to render the 
sentences void." 147 S.E.2d at 78, 83. They remanded the case for re-sentencing, but that process 
was pre-empted, and ultimately made moot, by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Loving. 
78. Pratt, supra note 63 (manuscript at 11). 
79. See Pratt, supra note 63 (manuscript at 14). They did, however, consent to participate in 
a press conference at Cohen and Hirschkop's office in Alexandria when the decision was announced. 
See Pratt, supra note 63 (manuscript at 14). As examples of the articles which followed, including 
the famous picture of the couple, see, e.g., Court Kills Mixed Marriage Lows, Upholds King 
Contempt Conviction, AlLANTA CONSTITUTION, June 13, 1967, at I; Lyle Denniston, Marriage Bans 
Voided, WASHINGTON STAR, June 12, 1967, at AI; Charles McDowell Jr., Miscegenation Ban Is 
Ended By High Coun, RICHMOND DMES-DISPATCH, June 13, 1967, at AI; State Couple 'Overjoyed' 
By Ruling, RICHMOND DMES-DISPATCH, June 13, 1967, at Bl; Gene M. Wite, Court Overturns 
Virginia's Ban on Mixed Marriages, WASHINGTON POST, June 13, 1967, at AI. This time the verdict 
was also announced on the front page of the NEw YORK TIMES. See Justices Upset All Bans On 
Interracial Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1967, at 1. 
80. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). On the reluctance of the NAACP 
and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund to become involved, see Pratt, supra note 63 
(manuscript at 28-30 n.20). See also SICKELS, supra note 3, at 87-89; Peter Wallenstein, Race, 
Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia, 1860s-1960s, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 371, 
423-30 (1994). Mark V. Tushnet notes in his book that Thurgood Marshall met with Roger Baldwin 
of the ACLU, and apparently cautioned Baldwin "that it was not useful to attack laws prohibiting 
interracial marriages 'because they are commonly circumvented and do not constitute a practical 
issue.'" MAKING CML RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, 
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Consider the contrast with the Baehr case. Baehr was the brainchild of 
William Woods, founder of the Gay and Lesbian Community Center in 
Honolulu and a longtime gay activist. Woods had been planning the case 
for almost a decade. 81 The named plaintiff, Ninia Baehr, was recruited by 
Woods based on her previous work as an activist at the University of Ha-
waii. 82 In contrast to the Lovings, none of the same-sex couples had mar-
ried elsewhere, for this was impossible. None had been exiled from Hawaii 
for applying for a marriage license. Instead, when their license applications 
were denied, as expected, they filed suit directly against the marriage stat-
ute and held a press conference in downtown Honolulu. 83 
At first, national gay and lesbian groups, and even the local ACLU, 
refused to help them. Once the lawsuit was underway, Dan Foley, the plain-
tiffs' attorney, did receive some help from the local ACLU and Lambda 
attorneys, but no one expected that the case would be successful. It was 
only after the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in 1993 that Lamdba 
joined as co-counsel.84 
On May 5, 1993, the day of the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision, the 
three same-sex couples became instant celebrities. 85 Ninia Baehr, Genora 
Dancel and their lawyers have since carried on a nationwide campaign to 
publicize their relationship and their legal claims. From newspapers to 
prime time TV, from their ceremony on the edge of Haleakala volcano to 
the steps of the U.S. Capitol, Ninia and Genora have taken their case to the 
American people. Well-protected by their legal and political handlers, they 
are an extremely appealing couple. 86 
at 44 (1994). Other than this, the issue of interracial marriage appears in Tushnet's book only in one 
footnote. That note observes that interracial marriage was treated differently by the U.S. Supreme 
Court than other civil rights issues, illustrating this by reference to the Court's (non-) decision in 
Nairn v. Nairn. /d. at 367 n.2. 
81. According to Paul Barren of the Wall Street Journal, "The couples were introduced to 
each other by Bill Woods, a local - and controversial - gay activist who knew about their common 
interest in marriage." Barren, supra note 67. Indeed, at the time the suit was filed, on May I, 1991, 
Woods had already been working on the "same-sex marriage" issue for nine years. Linda Hosek, 
Three Same-Sex Pairs Sue to Wed, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., May I, 1991, at A3. A detailed 
chronology since 1980 of Woods' efforts to research and launch the case can be found in Marriage-
Digest VI #559 (Sept. 30, 1996) <MARRIAGE@abacus.oxy.edu> (an e-mail list-serve focused on 
"same-sex marriage"). Further information on the GLEA Foundation and the Hawaii Gay Marriage 
Project can be obtained from Woods at <HawaiiGayl @aol.com>. 
82. Baehr was serving as Co-Coordinator of the University of Hawaii Women's Center. Her 
activism was evidently broad-ranging. See OLIVER, supra note 65, at 241. In October 29, 1992, 
Baehr traveled to Peru to participate in a press conference in support of Abimael Guzman, arrested 
leader of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrilla movement. !d. 
83. Hosek, supra note 81; Barren, supra note 67. 
84. Conspiracy Claim Ludicrous, Couples Say, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Aug. 26, 1996, at 
A2; Barren, supra note 67. 
85. Barren, supra note 67 ("Meanwhile, the plaintiffs have been inundated by attention .... 
Ms. Baehr and Ms. Dance! have become celebrities in the gay community, appearing at fund-raisers 
from San Francisco to New York's Fire Island."). 
86. Joe Melillo and Patrick Lagon have also given many interviews, but the third couple, 
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In Baehr, like in Loving, there was an initial reluctance to pursue the 
question of marriage on the part of national legal organizations because of 
concerns about strategy and timing. After all, it had been less than ten 
years since the U.S. Supreme Court had reaffirmed the rights of states to 
criminalize sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick. 87 This was hardly an auspi-
cious precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage. 
In Baehr, unlike in Loving, this reluctance has been deepened by dis-
agreements within the gay and lesbian community about marriage itself. 
Some objected in principle to the institution of marriage, seeing it as an 
archaic and inherently heterosexist institution. They were (and still are) 
more interested in promoting anti-discrimination laws and domestic part-
nership benefits. 88 Once the Baehr decision arrived, however, and the 
struggle was inevitable, gay and lesbian groups began closing ranks. Ad-
vocates of same-sex marriage have intensified their arguments to their col-
leagues, and have succeeded in getting most gay and lesbian organizations 
to endorse the right to marry. 89 Nevertheless, the debate goes on.9° For 
some, marriage is just the start of what they hope will be a deeper revolu-
tion in family law. David Chambers, a prominent law professor at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, has this to say about the meaning of same-sex mar-
riage: 
Antoinette Pregil and Tammy Rodrigues, are more reluctant. For profiles of the plaintiffs, see Susan 
Essoyan, Life is quiet for Hawaii's Gay-Marriage Pioneers, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 1996, at AI; 
Discussion on Same-Sex Marriages Becoming Legal in Hawaii, Interview by Brian Williams, 
MSNBC, Dec. 3, 1996, 1996 WL 16295816; Gay Marriage Plaintiffs Genora Dance/ and Ninia 
Baehr Discuss Their Desire to be Married, Interview by Paula Zahn, CBS THIS MORNING, July 14, 
1995, 1995 WL 3220631; Robert Castillo, Toni and Tammy's Wedding: An Interview with Hawaii 
Marriage Plaintiff Toni Pregil, (visited Nov. 6, 1997) <http://www.suba.com/-outlines/enla-
archives/april97/hawaiiwe.html>; Alan Matsuoka, And now, the trial . .. , HONOLULU STAR-BULL.. 
May 14, 1996, (viewed April 22, 1998) <http:l/starbulletin.com/96/05/14/news/storyl.html>. 
87. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See generally Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay 
Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993); Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in 
the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 
VA. L. REV. 1643 (1993). 
88. One prominent example is noted author Frank Browning. His reaction to the push for 
same-sex marriage is this: "The problem is with the shape of marriage itself. ... We homosexuals 
have invented richer alternatives." Why Marry? N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1996, at A23. 
89. See, e.g., Marriage Resolution: Selected Signatories (visited Mar. 21, 1998) 
<http://www.lamdalegal.org/cgi!bin/pages/documents/record?record=l42>. The Resolution, initiated by 
Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, reads as follows: "Because marriage is a basic human 
right and an individual personal choice, RESOLVED, the State should not interfere with same-gender 
couples who choose to marry and share fully and equally in the rights, responsibilities, and 
commitment of civil marriage." /d. 
90. See EsKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 7, at 51-86 (the debate 
within the gay and lesbian community); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage 
Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 567 (1994-1995); and William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes 
Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L..J. 1623, 1635-39 
(1997). 
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If the law of marriage can be seen as facilitating the opportu-
nities of two people to live an emotional life that they find 
satisfying-rather than as imposing a view of proper rela-
tionships-the law ought to be able to achieve the same for 
units of more than two .... it seems at least as likely that the 
effect of permitting same-sex marriage will be to make society 
more receptive to the further evolution of the law. By ceasing 
to conceive of marriage as a partnership composed of one per-
son of each sex, the state may become more receptive to units 
of three or more (all of which, of course, include at least two 
persons of the same sex) and to units composed of two people 
of the same sex but who are bound by friendship alone. All 
desirable changes in family law need not be made at once.91 
Another difference between Loving and Baehr is the degree to which a 
"public education" campaign was thought to be necessary on the part of 
the plaintiffs. In Loving, the plaintiffs' attorneys and allied groups concen-
trated on the lawsuit, and did not do a lot of "outreach." There was surpris-
ingly little coverage of the Loving case as it made its way through the 
courts. 92 
91. David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs 
of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 490-91 (1996). Chambers, a law professor 
at the University of Michigan, is also a resident of Vermont. He recently co-authored an amicus brief 
in the Vermont same-sex marriage case, Baker. v. Vermont. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Parents and 
Friends of Lesbian and Gay Men of the Champlain Valley, Marble Valley, Barre/Montpelier, the 
Vermont Freedom to Marry Task Force, the ACLU of Vermont, and the American Civil Liberties 
Union. Baker v. Vermont, No. SI009-97Cnc (Vt. Sup. Ct., Dec. 17, 1997), appeal docketed, No. 
98-32 (Vt. 1998). 
92. A Library of Congress search of the RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, WASHINGTON STAR, 
WASIDNGTON POST, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION and NEW YORK TIMES unearthed no stories about the 
case between 1959 and 1964, the point at which the Lovings' attorneys filed suit in U.S. District 
Court. (There may, however, have been articles in the Richmond Afro-American.) Thereafter, there 
were articles covering the initiation of the suit, and U.S. District Judge John D. Butzner's refusal 
to grant a temporary restraining order that would allow the Lovings to visit their families in Virginia. 
See Court Backs Ban on Mixed Marriages, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Oct. 29, 1964, at 29; 'Exiled' 
Couple Sues to Void Ban on Interracial Marriage, WASHINGTON STAR, Oct. 28, 1964, at AI; Judge 
Denies Suit Against Marriage Ban, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 30, 1964; Mixed Couple's Plea Is 
Rejected, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 30, 1964; State's Interracial Marriage Ban Challenged 
in Federal Court, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 29, 1964, at 6; White Man, Negro Wife 
Challenge Virginia Bans, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 29, 1964, at A3; White-Negro Couple Fights 
Marriage Ban, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Oct. 29, 1964, at 17. See also Miscegenation Case to Go 
to State Court, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 13, 1965, (reporting the three-judge federal panel 
declining to rule on the validity of Virginia's law). After the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
upheld Virginia's law in Loving, on March 7, 1966, a major profile of the Lovings appeared in Life 
Magazine: The Crime of Being Married, LIFE, Mar. 18, 1966, at 85-91. The next round of stories 
came when the case was accepted for review by the U.S. Supreme Court. See High Court to 
Consider Lovings' Case, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 13, 1966, at AI; High Court to Rule on 
Miscegenation, WASHINGTON STAR, Dec. 12, 1966, at AI; Interracial Marriage Gets Review, 
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 13, 1966; Charlotte G. Moulton, Supreme Court Upholds Hoffa Conviction, 
ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Dec. 13, 1966, at 2; Supreme Court's Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1966, 
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In contrast, the supporters of "same-sex marriage" have created an en-
tire organizational infrastructure to advance their "public education" ef-
forts. In Hawaii, the Hawaii Equal Rights Marriage Project (HERMP), 
now renamed Marriage Project-Hawaii, has taken a central role. William 
Woods, meanwhile, continues his advocacy through the Hawaii Gay Mar-
riage Project. Nationally, the Marriage Project, based at Lambda Legal 
Defense & Education Fund in New York City, is a center of coordination. 
The National Freedom to Marry Coalition, based at the Marriage Project, 
is uniting local and statewide "right to marry" organizations. The coalition 
encourages celebrations of National Freedom to Marry Day on February 
12th, combining Lincoln's Birthday with Valentine's Day, based on the 
theme that equality plus love equals marriage.93 
Developments in the periods preceding the decisions in Loving and 
Baehr were quite different. Between 1949 and 1967, there were frequent 
attacks on the constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws. 94 These were 
accompanied by increasing attention from legal commentators.95 Although 
at 39. No stories appeared thereafter in the TIMES-DISPATCH, STAR, POST, CONSTITUTION or NEW 
YoRK TIMES until the final decision was announced on June 12, 1967. 
93. See the extensive websites of the Freedom to Marry Coalition at <http://www.ftm.org>, 
and the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund's Marriage Project at 
<http://www.lambdalegal.org>. See also NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INSTITUTE, 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD: ORGANIZING FOR OUR RIGHT TO MARRY (Robert Bray & Beth Barrett eds., 
1995) (providing strategic advice for the debate). The newly-formed Federation of Statewide Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Political Organizations has announced a coordinated nationwide 
campaign March 21-27. 1999 "which will include marches, rallies, and lobbying in state capitals." 
Peter Freiberg, 50 State Capital Event Set for Spring of 1999; 'It's So Important to Focus on State 
Issues,' WASHINGTON BLADE, April 24, 1998, at I, 18; and M. Jane Taylor, 50 State 'Action' Date 
Set for Week l!( March 1999, WASHINGTON BLADE, May 8, 1998, at 18. For more on the Federation, 
see <http://www .ngltf.org!Press/-fed2.htmi>. 
94. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (striking down a Florida law 
forbidding interracial sexual relations, but declining to rule on the constitutionality of Florida's anti-
miscegenation statute); Jackson v. State, 72 So.2d 116 (Ala 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954) 
(upholding Alabama's anti-miscegenation statute); Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (striking 
down California's anti-miscegenation statute as unconstitutional); Nairn v. Nairn, 87 S.E. 2d 749 (Va. 
1955), remanded 350 U.S. 891 (1955), ajf'd, 90 S.E.2d 849, app. dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) 
(upholding Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute; the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately declines review). 
95. Shortly before Loving was decided, an important exchange of views was published in the 
Virginia Law Review. Compare Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth 
Amendment: The Original Intent. 52 VA. L. REV. 1224 (1966) (arguing that Virginia's law was 
constitutional), with Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in 
Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189 (1966) (arguing the unconstitutionality of Virginia's 
statute). The Supreme Court cited Wadlington's article in their opinion. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 5 
n.4, 6 n.6. But the issue had been simmering in scholarly circles for some time. See Harvey M. 
Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Problem, 53 GEO. L.J. 49 (1964); 
Note, Constitutionality of Anti-Miscegenation Statutes, 58 YALE L.J. 472 (1949); Note, The 
Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes, I How. L.J. 87 (1955); Archibald Cox, Foreword, 
Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights: The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 
80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966); Jerold D. Cummins & John L. Kane, Comment, Miscegenation, the 
Constitution, and Science, 38 DICTA 24 (1961); Wayne A. Melton, Constitutionality of State Anti-
Miscegenation Statutes, 5 Sw. L.J. 451 (1951); Cyrus E. Phillips IV, Note, Miscegenation: The 
Courts and the Constitution, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 133 (1966); C.D. Shokes, Note, The Serbonian 
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the litigation was mostly unsuccessful, fourteen of the twenty-nine states 
with anti-miscegenation laws had repealed them by the time of the Loving 
decision, leaving only sixteen of the fifty states with laws to be overruled. 96 
The Federal Constitution had included the Fourteenth Amendment for a 
century, and when the U.S. Supreme Court finally gave these laws the 
coup de grace, their judgment in Loving was unanimous.97 
The situation with Baehr is quite different. Before Baehr, as we have 
already seen, no marriage laws had been successfully challenged. 98 While 
legal scholarship on same-sex marriage was increasing before Baehr, it 
had not assumed its current flood-like proportions.99 While thirty-five 
states permitted interracial marriages before Loving, no states permitted 
same-sex marriages before Baehr. As we have seen, even the original 
Baehr opinion was split 2-1-2. 100 
In short, Loving was the end of a process of constitutional and popular 
deliberation stretching over decades, if not a century. Baehr, on the other 
hand, was the surprising beginning of a legal revolution, catapulted by two 
state court justices over the heads of their own people. 
The public responses to Loving and Baehr, not surprisingly, have also 
been quite different. There was no "massive resistance" to Loving, and no 
Bog of Miscegenation, 21 ROCKY MN. L. REv. 425 (1948-1949); Note, Statutory Ban on Interracial 
Marriage Invalidated by Fourteenth Amendment, I STAN L. REV. 289 (1949); Irving G. Tragen, 
Comment, Statutory Prohibitions Against Interracial Marriage, 32 CAL. L. REV. 269, 267 (1944); 
Andrew D. Weinberger, A Reappraisal of the Constitutionality of Miscegenation Statutes, 42 
CORNELL L.Q. 208 (1957); John H. Wilharm, Jr., Note, Racial Intermarriage -A Constitutional 
Problem, 11 W. RESERVE L. REV. 93 (1959); Edward T. Wright, Comment, Interracial Marriage: 
A Survey of Statutes and Their Interpretations, I MERCER L. REV. 83 (1949). 
96. These states were Arizona, California (after Perez), Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. Loving, 388 
U.S. I, 6 n.S. 
97. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment of the Court, but offered a much simpler 
opinion: "I have previously expressed the belief that 'it is simply not possible for a state law to be 
valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the 
actor.' McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (concurring opinion). Because I adhere to that 
belief, I concur in the judgment of the Court." Loving, 388 U.S. at 13. 
98. See supra note 4 (listing several key prior same-sex marriage cases). For a discussion of 
the history of the gay marriage movement, including a full list of the pre-Baehr cases, see ESKRIDGE, 
THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 7, at 42-62, 232-233, n. 24. 
99. Using Appendix A in Wardle, supra note 3, I find roughly forty-one law review articles 
between January 1990 through December 1993 (counting all 1993 articles as pre-Baehr except for 
those explicitly about the Baehr decision). For post-Baehr articles, see infra, note 110. 
100. See supra note 17 (plurality opinion by Levinson, J. and Moon, J. with concurrence by 
Bums, J.; dissent by Heen, J., which Hayashi, J., would have joined, if the decision had been issued 
before he retired). Since the 1993 opinion, three new Justices have joined Levinson and Moon. One, 
Justice Paula Nakayama, added her vote to Levinson and Moon's ruling when the Hawaii Supreme 
Court responded to the Attorney General's Motion for Reconsideration. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 
44, 74-75 (Haw. 1993). The other two Justices, Robert Klein and Mario Rami!, have not addressed 
the issue on the court. Klein, however, heard and dismissed the original Baehr complaint, so he may 
recuse himself. 
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move to amend the Virginia Constitution. 101 Indeed, in the Epilogue to 
SIMPLE JUSTICE, the classic work on Brown v. Board of Education, Rich-
ard Kluger notes that "in 1967, with barely a murmur of objection in the 
land, the Court ruled in Loving v. Virginia that state laws forbidding [what 
had been considered] that most detestable of all rites-the joining of a 
white and a Negro in holy matrimony-were unconstitutional."102 Once the 
case was over, the issue of anti-miscegenation laws faded into virtual ob-
scurity, to become mostly the province of historians and legal theorists. 103 
With the twenty-fifth and thirtieth anniversaries of the Loving case, how-
ever, interest in the drama of Richard and Mildred Loving has revived, and 
new scholarly works are beginning to appear. 104 
101. The day after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, the editorial board of the RICHMOND 
TIMES-DISPATCH had this to say: "Considerable attention is being given nationally to the Supreme 
Court's action yesterday in throwing out Virginia's law which made interracial marriage a crime. The 
ruling, affecting miscegenation laws in 16 states, is important from the historical standpoint, but few 
observers had entertained any serious doubts as to what the court would do on the issue. . . . The 
decision was in line with many others on racial matters that have been handed down in recent 
years." A Day in Court, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 13, 1967, at Al2. 
102. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 751 (1975) (emphasis added). There were isolated 
incidents of resistance, but they were all localized, and were addressed relatively quickly. See 
SICLKELS, supra note 3, at 111-16 (giving narrative of events in various states). 
103. One major profile of the Lovings appeared after the decision. See Simeon Booker, The 
Couple that Rocked the Courts, EBONY, Sept. 1967, at 78-84 (cited in SICKELS, supra note 3, at 
161). In the years immediately following, several law review articles appeared, one dissertation was 
written, the only full-length book (to date) about the case appeared, and the briefs and oral arguments 
were published. See 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 687-1007 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975); SICKELS, 
supra note 3; Rev. Robert F. Drinan, The Loving Decision and the Freedom to Marry, 29 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 358 (1968); Sidney L. Moore, Note, Loving v. Virginia, 19 MERCER L. REV. 257 (1968); John 
M. Pittman, Note, Loving v. Virginia, 21 ARK. L. REV. 439 (1967); Chang Moon Sohn, Principle 
and Expediency in Judicial Review: Miscegenation Cases in the Supreme Court 30 n.46 (1970) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (cited in Pratt, supra note 63 (manuscript at 
30 n.46)). Thereafter, with the lone exception of A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF 
COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978), attention to anti-
miscegenation laws generally, and Loving in particular, fell dormant. 
104. In the late 1980s, interest in anti-miscegenation laws and the Loving case began to revive, 
much of it inspired by legal historians and critical race theorists. See F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS 
BLACK? ONE NATION'S DEFINITION (1991); IAN HANEY-LoPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS 
AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996); EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND 
SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH (1995); SAMUEL N. PINCUS, THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT, 
BLACKS AND THE LAw, 1870-1902 (1990); Steven A. Bank, Anti-Miscegenation Lows and the 
Dilemma of Symmetry: The Understanding of Equality in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 2 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 303 (1995); Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL L. REV. 2063 (1993); 
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law 
of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L. J. 1967 (1989); Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, 
Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y I, 19-23 (1996); Paul A. Lombardo, Miscegenation, Eugenics, and 
Racism: Historical Footnotes to Loving v. Virginia, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (1988); Peggy 
Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of "Race" in Twentieth-Century America, 
J. AM. HIST., June 1996, at 45-69; Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Low of Freedom: 
Alabama and Virginia, J860s-1960s, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 371 (1994). 
At least two Ph.D. candidates are currently writing on the issue: Melissa Cole, at the College 
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"Barely a murmur of objection in the land," however, is not the phrase 
that comes to mind for the response of the people of Hawaii-or the Amer-
ican people generally-to the prospect of legalized same-sex marriage. 105 
In less than three years, thirty states have passed laws rejecting the deci-
sions of the Hawaii courts.106 The United States Congress-with the sup-
port of President William Jefferson Clinton-has done likewise. 107 In re-
of William and Mary, and Gregory Michael Dorr, at the University of Virginia. See Gregory Michael 
Dorr, Principled Expediency: Eugenics, Nairn v. Nairn, and the Supreme Court (1997) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). Meanwhile, University of Georgia historian Robert A. Pratt has 
recently published Crossing the Color Line: An Historical Assessment and Personal Narrative of 
Loving v. Virginia, 41 How. L.J. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript on file with author), and is 
preparing a full-length book on the history of both the Loving family and the Loving case. 
Recent legal scholarship on Loving, as we have already noted, has emphasized its alleged 
analogy with the current campaign for same-sex marriage. See supra, note 7. However, "Law and 
the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After 30 Years," the conference at which this paper was 
first presented, has resulted in several new papers which provide a more contextual, and less 
potentially anachronistic, reading of Loving and its place in the story of federal constitutional law. 
In addition to those in the instant issue of the B.Y.U. JoURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW, papers are being 
prepared for publication in 41 How. L.J. (forthcoming 1998), and _ CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 
(forthcoming 1998). See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional Right to 
Marry, 1790-1990, 41 How. L. J. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript on file with author), and Laurence 
C. Nolan, Equality and Marriage, From Loving to Zablocki, 41 How. L.J. (forthcoming 1998) 
(manuscript on file with author). For coverage of the conference on Loving. see David Wagner, 
Something Old, Something New, INSIGHT, Jan. 5, 1998, at 22-23; Bob Roehr, Drawing Parallels: 
'Loving' and Same Sex Marriage, In Newsweekly, (Boston, MA), Dec. 7, 1997, at!, 12; and Mark 
Pattison, How Could Courts Justify-or Deny-Same Sex Marriage?, CATHOLIC HERALD 
(Sacramento, CA), Dec. 6, 1997 (wire story distributed by Catholic News Service). 
I 05. Andrew Sullivan has argued that if "same-sex marriage" is legalized, then ninety percent 
of the gay and lesbian legal agenda will be achieved overnight. See ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY 
NORMAL 185 (1995). His opponents agree, which may explain why Baehr has generated such an 
intense reaction. Tom Stoddard has described it as "a nationwide political riot against same-sex 
marriage." Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Low to Make Social Change, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 988 (1997). Or one can call it "using the law to make social change." 
106. In addition to Hawaii, which passed such legislation in 1994, these States include: Utah 
(1995); Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee (1996); Arkansas, 
Florida, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, and Virginia (1997); and, 
as of May, 1998, Alabama, Iowa, Kentucky and the State of Washington. To date, Nevada and 
Massachusetts are the only States in which no marriage recognition bills have been introduced. 
Shortly after the Hawaii trial court's decision in December, 1996, former Governor William Weld 
of Massachusetts voiced his opinion that couples who might marry in Hawaii and move to 
Massachusetts "would be entitled to all the benefits and burdens of marriage." Weld: Mass. Would 
Honor Out-of-State Gay Unions; Marriage Ruling Stayed in Hawaii, BosTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 1996, 
at AI. Since then, however, his successor has offered his similar assurances. 
For regular updates on State legislation, see <http://www.pono.net> ("In Defense of Marriage" 
page of the Hawaii Catholic Conference); and <http://www.ftm.org> (The website of the Freedom 
to Marry Coalition). 
107. See The Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996). As enacted, the Act has 
two provisions: (I) it clarifies that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution does not 
require that same-sex marriages be recognized by other states; and (2) it defines marriage for 
purposes of federal law as the union of one man and one woman. Section 2, which addresses Full 
Faith and Credit, is codified at 28 U .S.C. § 1738C (1996). Section 3, which defines marriage for 
purposes of federal law, is codified at I U.S.C. § 7 (1996). On February 7, 1997, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) released a follow-up report, agreed to as part of the legislative negotiations 
surrounding the Defense of Marriage Act. The report, GAO/OGC-97-16, can be found at 
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sponse, Lambda has already announced that as soon as possible, they will 
challenge the Defense of Marriage Act. 108 Articles advocating the legaliza-
tion of same-sex marriage are pouring out of law reviews post-Baehr, 
many of them "playing the Loving card."109 Consistent with this, most of 
the legal academy has reacted with predictable disdain toward the Defense 
of Marriage Act. 110 Nevertheless, state and federal legislative bodies con-
<http://www.gao.gov>. It identified 1,049 Federal laws based upon marital status. 
108. In Lambda's words: "Hearkening back to the not-so-long-ago ugly days of past 
discrimination against those who chose to marry the 'wrong' kind of person (such as interracial or 
interfaith couples), and the days when Americans had to 'go to Reno' just to get a civil divorce, 
these state and federal anti-marriage bills are unconstitutional, divisive, wrong, and cruel. They can 
and must be stopped now. state by state." 1998 Anti-Marriage Bills Status Report (Mar. 10, 1998) 
<http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=51>. The same section of the 
website also includes an Anti-Marriage Legislation Map <http://www.lambdalegal.org/ 
cgibin/pages/states/antimarriage-map> and a legal memorandum on the Defense of Marriage Act. See 
Constitutional and Legal Defects in H.R 3396 and S. 1740, the Proposed Federal Legislation on 
Marriage and the Constitution (Sept. 1, 1996) <http://www.labmdalega.org/cgibin/pages/documents/ 
record ?record=80>. 
109. Using Appendix A in Wardle, supra note 3, I find two articles about Baehr in 1993 and 
twenty-five in 1994. In a Westlaw search for subsequent years--counting only articles prim11rily 
about same-sex marriage (not about adoption, domestic partnership, Romer v. Evans generally, or 
gay/lesbian jurisprudence generally)-! find roughly thirty-five articles in 1995, thirty-four in 1996, 
and at least thirty-five in 1997. In short, there have been more than one hundred law review articles 
primarily about "same-sex marriage" published in English-language law reviews since the 1993 Baehr 
decision. For a partial list of those that address the question of "the Loving analogy," see supra, note 
7. 
II 0. As one might expect, there is already a flood of law review articles attacking the Defense 
of Marriage Act, many of them written by prominent advocates of same-sex marriage. See, e.g., 
STRASSER, LEGALLY WED, supra note 7, at 127-58; Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why 
the Defense of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 1997); Mark 
Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the Constitution, 
58 U. PITT. L. REV. 279 (1997); Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, The Supreme Court's 
Decision in Romer v. Evans and its Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 16 QLR 217 
(1996); Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, DOMA 's House Divided: An Argument Against the 
Defense of Marriage Act, 44-SEP FED. LAW. 30 (]997). 1reprinted in 58-JAN OR. ST. B. BULL. 17 
(1998). Lynn Wardle has responded to Wolfson and Melcher in DOMA: Protecting Federalism in 
Family Law, 45-JAN FED. LAW. 30 (1998). 
Other articles on the Defense of Marriage Act include James M. Donovan, DOMA: An 
Unconstitutional Establishment a[ Fundamentalist Christianity, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 335 (1997); 
Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy 
Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997); Melissa Rothstein, The Defense of Marriage Act and 
Federalism: A States' Rights Argument in Defense of Same-Sex Marriages, 31 FAM. L.Q. 571 (1997) 
(1997 Schwab Essay Winner); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and the 
Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1435 (1997); Leonard G. Brown III, 
Comment, Constitutionality Defending Marriage: The Defense of Marriage Act, Romer v. Evans and 
the Cultural Battle They Represent, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 159 (1997); Diane M. Guillerman, 
Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing Battle to Legalize 
Same-Sex Marriage, 34 Hous. L. REV. 425 (1997); Christopher J. Hayes, Note, Married Filing 
Jointly: Federal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages Under the Internal Revenue Code, 47 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1593; Julie L. B. Johnson, Comment, The Meaning of "General Laws": The Extent of 
Congress's Power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Constitutionality of the Defense 
of Marriage Act. 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1611 (1997); Timothy Joseph Keefer, Note, DOMA As a 
Defensible Exercise of Congressional Power Under the Full-Faith-And-Credit Clause, 54 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1635 (1997); Jon-Peter Kelly, Act of Infidelity: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is 
Unfaithful to the Constitution, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 203 (1997); Melissa Provost, Comment, 
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tinue to reaffirm their judgment that marriage is indeed a unique, male-fe-
male sexual community. The people of Hawaii may well amend their own 
constitution before the drama is over. 111 Advocates of "same-sex marriage" 
have "played the Loving card" in Baehr so that it would turn out like Lov-
ing, but it hasn't-at least not yet. 112 
C. A Tale of Two Amici 
A comparison of amici in Loving and Baehr sheds additional light on 
the differences between the two cases. Some organizations, such as the 
NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., filed in 
Loving but not in Baehr. 113 Other organizations that existed in 1967 did 
not file in Loving, but did file in Baehr. 114 Among those that filed in both 
Disregarding the Constitution in the Name of Defending Marriage: The Unconstitutionality of the 
Defense of Marriage Act, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 157 (1997); Barbara A. Robb, Note, The 
Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act in the Wake of Romer v. Evans, 32 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 263 (1997); Mark Tanney, Note and Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: A "Bare Desire 
to Harm" An Unpopular Minority Cannot Constitute a Legitimate Governmental Interest, 19 
THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 99 (1997); Alec Walen, Essay, The "Defense of Marriage Act" and 
Authoritarian Morality, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619 (1997); E. Todd Wilkowski, Comment, 
The Defense of Marriage Act: Will it be the Final Word in the Debate over Legal Recognition of 
Same-Sex Unions?, 8 REGENT U. L. REV. 195 (1997). 
Ill. Supra, note 61. 
112. The Alaska Legislature has just placed a proposed Marriage Amendment onto the 
November 3, 1998 ballot, designed to overturn judicially-mandated "same-sex marriage." S.J.R. 42 
(Ak. 1998) (enacted). The proposed Marriage Amendment passed the Senate on April 16, 1998 by 
a vote of 14-6. Senate: One Man, One Woman, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 17, 1998, at AI, 
Al4. On May II, an amended version of S.J.R. 42 pased the House by a vote of 28-12, and the 
Senate concurred in the amendments. Marriage Measure on Ballot, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 
12, 1998, at AI, AS. The Amendment was introduced in response to a decision by Anchorage 
Superior Court Judge Peter J. Michalski, holding that the State's marriage and marriage recognition 
Jaws merit strict scrutiny under the Privacy Clause of the Alaska State Constitution. Brause v. Bureau 
of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 Cl, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). 
113. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the NAACP, Loving (No. 395), reprinted in LANDMARK 
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 103, at 887; Brief of Amicus Curiae the NAACP Legal Defense 
and Educational Fund, Loving (No. 395), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra 
note 103, at 905. Despite the presence of other national civil rights organizations on briefs in Baehr 
(e.g. the Mexican-American Legal Defense & Education Fund), the NAACP has not joined the effort 
to link interracial marriage and same-sex marriage. 
114. This would include Agudath Israel, American Friends Service Committee, The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, National Association of 
Evangelicals, Southern Baptist Convention, and two organizations which had just fonned: Christian 
Legal Society and the National Organization of Women (NOW). 
Many other organizations which did not exist at the time of Loving have filed amicus briefs in 
Baehr. These briefs from the Baehr v. Miike appeal (and others, such as those filed by Attorneys 
General, legislators, and academic experts) can be found online at <http://www.cs.unt.edu/home/-
hughes/index.html>. Briefs filed in support of the marriage law include those of the American Center 
for Law and Justice (ACU), Coral Ridge Ministries Media Inc., et al., Hawaii's Future Today, the 
Rutherford Institute, the Independent Women's Forum, the National Association for Research and 
Therapy of Homosexuality, Inc., and various denominational and ecumenical organizations which 
joined the Christian Legal Society brief. Briefs filed against the marriage Jaw include those of the 
Madison Society of Hawaii, Na Mamo 0 Hawaii, the Gay and Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, 
NOW Foundation, NOW Legal Defense & Education Fund, National Center for Lesbian Rights, 
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cases, there are three variations. Some supported the plaintiffs in both 
cases. 115 Other attorneys general supported the State in both cases. 116 The 
Roman Catholic Church supported the Lovings in 1967, but the State in 
1997.117 
It is particularly interesting to contrast two amici who have been in-
volved in both Loving and Baehr: The Japanese-American Citizens 
League (JACL) and the Roman Catholic Church. Both organizations have 
done so in a manner consistent with their principles, yet they agreed about 
Loving and disagree about Baehr. Why the difference between these orga-
nizations? 
In 1967, the JACL submitted a lengthy amicus brief in support of the 
Lovings. At that time, their argument about marriage was as follows: 
Freedom in marriage concerns one of the most basic and fun-
damental rights of the individual, rooted, indeed, in one of 
man's biological drives. The mutual exercise by two individu-
als of such a right-a noble goal otherwise promoted and 
blessed by society-should not be converted into a crime or 
otherwise stigmatized by law merely because of race. 118 
In 1994, however, the Honolulu chapter of the JACL became one of 
the first non-gay organizations in Hawaii to support same-sex marriage. 
When it took its position to the JACL National Board, they strongly en-
dorsed it. The Associate Director, Carol Hayashino, argued that "the same-
sex issue was a very natural progression in our direction as a civil rights 
organization." She added that the "rationale being used to oppose "same-
Northwest Women's Law Center, People for the American Way, Asian-American Legal Defense & 
Education Fund, and the Mexican-American Legal Defense & Education Fund. 
115. Two groups fit this description: the ACLU and the Japanese American Citizens League 
(JACL). In Loving the ACLU did not file, but was a key participant through their pro bono attorneys, 
Cohen and Hirschkop. In Baehr they filed a separate brief. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Hawaii Foundation, Baehr v. Miike (Haw. 1997) (No. 20371). On the 
JACL, see infra, notes 118-23. 
116. It is worth noting, however, that only one state, North Carolina, filed a brief on behalf 
of Virginia's anti-miscegenation law. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the State of North Carolina, 
Loving, (No. 395), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 103, at 951. (It 
would be interesting to know if efforts were made to contact Attorneys General in the other states 
which siill had anti-miscegenation laws at the time that Loving was briefed.) In contrast, eleven state 
Attorneys General joined a brief on behalf of Hawaii. Brief of Amici Curiae the States of Nebraska, 
Alabama, California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina and 
South Dakota in Support of the Defendant-Appellant, Baehr (Haw. 1997) (No 20371). 
117. The Loving brief was filed by sixteen Bishops, along with the National Catholic 
Conference for Interracial Justice and the National Catholic Social Action Conference. See Brief of 
Amici Curiae National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice, et al., Loving, (No. 395), reprinted 
in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 103, at 925. The Baehr brief was filed by the 
Hawaii Catholic Conference, an arm of the Diocese of Honolulu. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Hawaii 
Catholic Conference, Baehr (Haw. 1997) (No. 20371). 
118. Brief of Amicus Curiae Japanese American Citizens League at 3, 10-11, Loving (No. 
395), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 103, at 856, 863-64. 
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sex marriages" is very similar to the arguments once used to prohibit 
Asians from marrying whites: It's immoral, it would be harmful to soci-
ety." This triggered the public resignation of its general counsel, Allen 
Kato, who described same-sex marriage as "morally wrong."119 This set off 
a huge debate within the organization, which came to a head at the 1994 
JACL national convention in Salt Lake City. On August 6, after intense 
debate, Congressman Norman Mineta (D-San Jose) made the following 
plea to the members of the council: 
Where would we be today if the NAACP, or the National Coun-
cil of La Raza, or the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, 
or the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, had taken the 
position that redress was a Japanese American issue- and had 
nothing to do with Mrican-Americans, Hispanic Americans, 
Jews or gay and lesbian Americans?120 
After this impassioned plea, the national council voted 50-38 to support 
the board. 121 Within a year, however, newspapers were reporting that the 
entire national headquarters staff in San Francisco had been laid off. The 
layoffs were partly in retaliation for their involvement in this issue, accord-
ing to some parties, and the word on the street was that "the nation's oldest 
and most influential Asian-American civil rights group is threatening to 
unravel." 122 
Meanwhile, the Honolulu JACL chapter forged onward, filing amicus 
briefs at both the trial and appellate levels in the Baehr case. Its argument 
about marriage now sounds like this: 
The State's rhetoric against same-sex marriages is strikingly 
similar to the arguments made in a bygone era against inter-
racial marriages. For centuries, ignorant and racist lawmakers 
and jurists alike decried mixed-race relationships .... Today, 
for many, the idea that couples of the same sex might legally 
marry is equally absurd. However, public disapproval, should 
not bar this Honorable Court from equally enforcing the laws 
119. Steven A. Chin, Asian Group Split on Gay Rights; Japanese American Citizens League's 
Counsel Quits Over Board's Support of Same-Sex Marriages, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, June 19, 
1994, at Bl. 
120. Steven A. Chin, Vote for Gay Marriage Followed Uphill Fight; Issue Divides Japanese 
American Citizens League, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Aug. 10, 1994, at A4. 
121. See id. 
122. Dennis Akizuki, Rights Group for Japanese Fighting j{1r Life; Issues Split Old, Young 
Members, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 21, 1995, at A2 (reporting that "[T]he nation's 
oldest and most influential Asian-American civil rights group is threatening to unravel .... Rep. 
Norman Mineta of San Jose, a JACL member, declined to be interviewed about the turmoil, instead 
issuing a three-sentence statement. 'JACL plays an absolutely vital role in the civil rights movement, 
and has for many years,' Mineta said. 'I am hopeful that ... JACL will emerge with renewed 
strength. It's too important an institution to the Japanese-American community to be allowed to fail.") 
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of this state, including the right to marry .... Again, in the 
words of this Court: "[C]onstitutionallaw may mandate, like it 
or not, that customs change with an evolving social order .... 
In substance, the State's policy is based on crude stereotypes, 
not any meaningful effort to ensure that children are raised in 
supportive and loving homes. 123 
It concludes with these words: 
Notwithstanding the fact that our great state has dispelled the 
myth of interracial marriages, the State continues to hurl sim-
ilar arguments that same-sex marriages would have deplor-
able effects on our community and its children. This Court 
should not turn back the clock on social justice by denying the 
right to marriage to persons based on sex, in the same way 
marriages were at one time denied to persons based on race. 124 
233 
Now, the JACL considers sex to be just as irrelevant to marriage as race. 
Evidently, what really matters now is solely the individuals who are in-
volved. 
In 1967, the Roman Catholic Church also joined the attack on Vir-
ginia's anti-miscegenation law. The Church had a long history of opposi-
tion to compulsory sterilization laws, and as we have already seen, these 
laws were also tightly entwined with anti-miscegenation laws. 125 An ami-
cus curie brief was filed by 16 Bishops and Cardinals, including Bishop 
John Russell of Richmond, Virginia, joined by the National Catholic Con-
ference for Interracial Justice, represented by the late William Lewers, and 
the National Catholic Social Action Conference, represented by William 
Bentley Ball, soon to become famous for arguing Wisconsin v. Yoder. 126 
123. Brief of Amicus Curiae Japanese American Citizens League of Honolulu at 4, 6, 10, 
Baehr v. Miike (No. 91-1394-05) (Haw. Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 1996). See also Japanese American 
Citizens League of Honolulu Amicus Curiae Brief at 1,3,5, Baehr (Haw. 1997) (No.20371). 
124. !d. at 10. 
125. See Larson, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH, 107-15, 142-45, 
150-52 (1995) (describing Catholic opposition to proposed eugenics laws). 
126. See supra note 117. Reverend Lewers served as the Director of the Center for Civil and 
Human Rights at Notre Drune Law School until he passed away on April 19, 1997. Willirun Bentley 
Ball continues to argue cases before the Supreme Court. See his MERE CREATURES OF THE STATE? 
EDUCATION, RELIGION AND THE COURTS-A VIEW FROM THE COURTROOM (1994). In the Loving case, 
the following Bishops signed onto the runicus brief: John J. Russell, Bishop of Richmond; Lawrence 
Cardinal Shehan, Archbishop of Baltimore; Paul A. Hallinan, Archbishop of Atlanta; Philip M. 
Hanna, Archbishop of New Orleans; Robert E. Lucy, Archbishop of San Antonio; Joseph B. Brunini, 
Apostolic Administrator of Natchez-Jackson; Lawrence M. DeFalco, Bishop of Amarillo; Joseph A. 
Dirick, Apostolic Administrator of Nashville; Thomas K. Gorman, Bishop of Dallas-Ft. Worth; 
Joseph H. Hodges, Bishop of Wheeling; John L. Morkovsky, Apostolic Administrator of Galveston-
Houston; Victor J. Reed, Bishop of Oklahoma City and Tulsa; L.J. Reicher, Bishop of Austin; 
Thomas Tschoepe, Bishop of San Angelo; Ernest L. Unterkoefler, Bishop of Charleston; and Vincent 
S. Water, Bishop of Raleigh. 
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In that brief, the Bishops and Cardinals made no arguments about the 
definition of marriage as such. They assumed "marriage" to be an inde-
pendent social institution, based on the union of a man and a woman. The 
only issue was to what extent the state could legitimately regulate that in-
stitution. The real question in this case, they argued, was whether a state's 
desire to restrict marriage on racial grounds should take precedence over 
the free exercise of religion and the right to bear children. Based on a com-
bination of First Amendment and Due Process grounds, they argued that it 
should not, quoting the familiar texts from Maynard v. Hill, Meyer v. Ne-
braska and Skinner v. Oklahoma that all later appeared in Loving. 127 
In 1967, the JACL and the Catholic Church agreed about the meaning 
of marriage. By 1997, their understandings had diverged. As we have 
seen, the current JACL brief simply assumes that race and sex are equally 
irrelevant to marriage, and what matters is the association of individuals. 
In contrast, the Catholic Church has continued to argue that marriage is a 
unique sexual community and social institution, entered into by a man and 
a woman. While the state recognizes it, and religious communities bless it, 
marriage has an existence and integrity of its own in the social order. 128 In 
the words of the Most Reverend Francis X. DiLorenzo, Bishop of Hono-
lulu: 
We are not fooled by the rhetoric of'civil rights' and 'equality.' 
Hawaii is a very tolerant state. The Catholic Church has 
strongly supported civil rights. We are publicly committed to a 
pluralistic society with liberty and justice for all. T[he Com-
mission on Sexual Orientation and the Law], however, is up to 
something very different. In the name of 'equality' for individ-
uals, it seeks to redefine marriage as an institution. This 
mixes apples and oranges. Every individual is equal before the 
law, and rightfully so. But marriage is not a creation of the 
law; it precedes the law .... To use these great traditions [of 
individual liberties] of our people to attack the crucial institu-
tion of marriage is to treat our people as a group of fools. The 
Church did not define marriage, but it will defend it.129 
127. Brief of Amicus Curiae Japanese American Citizens League of Honolulu at 6, 12-13, 15. 
20-21 (quoting Maynard, Meyer, and Skinner); See also Loving, 388 U.S. I, 7, 12. 
128. "The community of marriage is different from all other communities and sexual 
relationships, including those communities that restrict themselves only to males or only to females. 
The uniqueness of the marital community grows out of physical characteristics that at once 
distinguish males and females and make it possible for them to unite in a conjugal bond. In no other 
community can two people physically unite themselves and their respective bloodlines to establish 
a common life which also creates and nurtures new life, therefore linking the wider human family 
across the generations." Brief of Amicus Curiae Hawaii Catholic Conference at 8-9, Baehr (Haw. 
1997) (No. 20371). 
129. Most Reverend Francis X. DiLorenzo, Can't 'Redefine' Marriage, HONOLULU 
ADVERTISER. Jan. 10, 1996, at Al2. Bishop Kenneth A. Angell of Burlington, Vermont has also filed 
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From the Church's point of view, however "thin" the language of the 
law may be when it comes to describing marriage, supporting marriage is a 
fully legitimate goal of the law. Indeed, the Church argues that a marriage 
law is not a "sex-based classification" at all, in the sense of preferring one 
sex over the other; it is a law that recognizes the reality of the union of the 
sexes. 130 
In their Post Trial Memorandum in Baehr, the plaintiffs attacked all 
the amicus briefs submitted by their opponents. 131 Yet they had little to say 
about the Catholic brief. They simply asserted, without any further argu-
ment, that the definitional approach to marriage "was rejected by the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii in Baehr v. Lewin as an 'exercise in tortured and 
conclusory sophistry,'" and stated that "the amicus curaie brief of the Ha-
waii Catholic Conference must be viewed accordingly."132 The words "ex-
ercise in tortured and conclusory sophistry," of course, come from the plu-
rality's discussion of Loving. Once again, the plaintiffs simply "played the 
Loving card." 
IV. CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE POLITICS OF ANALOGY 
There is no straightforward relationship between Loving v. Virginia 
and Baehr v. Miike. Both sides in the debate about legalizing "same-sex 
marriage" agree that Loving is a case about racial equality and the freedom 
to marry. Both sides also agree that Loving has something to say to our 
present time. There, however, the agreement ends. One side, in support of 
same-sex marriage, wants to use Loving to remove the current debate 
about marriage from the democratic process. This makes their use of Lov-
ing a transparent example of the politics of analogy. 
What seems to have eluded the proponents of the Loving analogy in 
Hawaii is the possibility that there may be a different point of view that is 
at least as thoughtful and principled as theirs. Instead, they are convinced 
that their cause is so righteous, and that their opponents are so unrighteous, 
that this cannot be conceded. Opponents must be treated as the equivalent 
of racists by playing the Loving card. When the number of dissenters rises, 
these advocates become even more firmly convinced that the definition of 
marriage cannot be allowed to be decided by "We the People," but must be 
decided in the judiciary instead. 
an amicus brief in Baker v. Vermont, the current "same-sex maniage" case on appeal to the Vermont 
Supreme Court. Brief Amicus Curiae, The Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington Vermont and the 
Burlington Vermont Stake of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Baker (1998) (No. 98-
32). 
130. ld. ("Except in [Baehr], the term 'sex' has been used only to refer to legal classifications 
which disadvantage one sex over the other."). 
131. See Plaintiffs' Post Trial Memorandum at 35-41, Baehr (No. 91-1394-05). 
132. ld. at 40-41. 
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The advocates of same-sex marriage sponsor National Freedom to 
Marry Day on Lincoln's Birthday, but fail to recall the Lincoln who coura-
geously critiqued the U.S. Supreme Court for its decision in the Dred Scott 
case: "[I]f the policy of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the 
whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court 
... the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having, to that ex-
tent, practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent 
tribunal."133 This same President Lincoln whom they say they revere also 
supported government "of the people, by the people, and for the peo-
ple."l34 
After the proposed Marriage Amendment passed the Hawaii Legisla-
ture in April, attorney Dan Foley's only response was to say that he hopes 
the Hawaii Supreme Court pre-empts it. 135 Evidently he believes that the 
question of marriage is too dangerous to be decided by the people. It never 
seems to occur to him, and his allies, that perhaps lawyers are too danger-
ous to be left with the question of marriage. There is a great irony in this. 
The plaintiffs claim that their goal is to be treated as equal citizens, yet 
their attorneys want to withdraw the resolution of the question from their 
fellow citizens. Are citizens too dangerous to be trusted with any judg-
ments about the common good?136 Is Loving now the paradigm for every 
important and controversial public policy question? 
From a Catholic point of view - and not only a Catholic point of 
view - things look very different. Just as the Virginia courts were trying 
to redefine marriage for their purposes, thereby distorting its genuine 
meaning, the Hawaii Courts have been trying to do the same thing. The 
content is different, but the strategy is the same: The State is attempting to 
redefine marriage to achieve its ideal of an improved society, rather than 
recognizing and building on the most crucial pre-political society of all, 
the unique community of marriage, based upon the union of the two 
sexes. 137 
133. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861) in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865 at 221 (D.E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989). 
134. /d. at 536 (quoting from the Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863)). 
135. William Kresnak, Lawyer Says Case Isn't Over, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, April 17, 1997 
at A? (stating Foley's opinion that the passage of the Marriage Amendment will not end the case 
because the legislature will have to pass a new law banning same-sex marriage, and the Court will 
rule before they do). 
136. On the importance of popular participation in fundamental lawmaking, see, THE END OF 
DEMOCRACY? THE JUDICIAL USURPATION OF POLITICS (1997); Mary Ann Glendon, A NATION UNDER 
LAWYERS (1994); Richard D. Parker, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST 
MANIFESTO (1994). The important trilogy by Christopher Wolfe offers a paradigm of how 
constitutional interpretation can be both principled and modest, without resorting to either an amoral 
positivism or a purely results-oriented activism; see The RISE OF MoDERN JUDICIAL REVIEW, rev. ed. 
(1994), HOW TO READ THE CONSTITUTION (1996), and JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, rev. ed. (1997). 
137. This similarity of strategies between the Virginia and Hawaii courts prompts a deeper 
question: Will the sins of slavery, segregation, and racism, which have so stained American history, 
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In Loving v. Commonwealth, the courts of Virginia, using the rhetoric 
of divine plan, were prepared to deconstruct and redefine marriage in order 
to achieve racist goals. In their universe, race meant everything. Their ulti-
mate goal was a society based on "racial integrity."138 These courts turned 
a case about marriage into a case about race. 
In Baehr v. Lewin, a plurality of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, using 
the rhetoric of state power, is prepared to deconstruct and redefine mar-
riage in order to advance its vision of social transformation. In its universe, 
individualism means everything. Its ultimate goal is a society based solely 
on individual equality, in which the only two players are individuals and 
the State. 139 It has turned a case about marriage into a case about individu-
als. 
Therefore, just as Loving represents the triumph of marriage over rac-
ism, so the proposed Marriage Amendment to the Hawaii Constitution, 
and the Defense of Marriage Act represent the triumph of marriage over -
isms that unjustly use the courts to deconstruct civil society and pit the in-
dividual against marriage, the democratic process, and ultimately liberty 
itself. 140 To paraphrase the words of the Hawaii Supreme Court: 
With all due respect to the Hawaii Supreme Court of the cur-
rent era, we do not believe that judges are the ultimate au-
thorities on the subject of Popular Will, and, as the controversy 
surrounding Baehr amply demonstrates, a constitutional 
amendment may mandate, like it or not, that courts change 
with an evolving democratic order. 141 
haunt every future effort to encourage civil society alongside civil rights? One can only hope and 
pray it will not be so. But if it does, to quote Lincoln once more, "The Almighty has his own 
purposes," and we wiU only be able to say, through our tears, that "The judgments of the Lord are 
true and righteous altogether." Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865 at 687. 
138. Judge Bazile's infamous words about "Almighty God" were evidently written in 1965 
when he rejected Cohen and Hirschkop's motion to set his original decision aside. See Pratt, 
Crossing the Color Line, supra note 63 (manuscript at 12, on ftle with author) (quoting Loving). On 
March 7, 1966, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld his decision, but did not repeat his 
inflammatory statement. Loving, 147 S.E.2d 78. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court quoted Judge 
Bazile in Loving, 388 U.S. at 3, and the rest is history. 
139. Thus the plurality in Baehr v. Lewin refers to marriage as "a state-conferred legal 
partnership status," and speaks of "the state's role as the exclusive progenitor of the marital 
partnership," and "the state's monopoly on the business of marriage creation." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 
58. 
140. Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court may need to defend the reality of marriage against 
the ideology of individualism, just as it defended it against the ideology of racism. Wherever and 
whenever the case arises that fmally makes it to the Court, we can hope that the Supreme Court will 
stiU defend the integration of the sexes in marriage. If it does not, a long and difficult battle for the 
Federal Marriage Amendment may be required in order to settle the matter. 
141. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993). 
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Now what is the point of these counter-analogies? Am I simply throw-
ing out a rhetorical red herring? Anyone sympathetic to the legalization of 
same-sex marriage may be offended, perhaps even outraged, by them. 
How dare I compare the Baehr Court to the Commonwealth Court? 
But that is precisely the point: when all is said and done, the Loving 
analogy is not the real issue. Analogies can be clever, and sometimes polit-
ically powerful, but they rest on a theory. Therefore, if we want to tran-
scend rhetorical punches and counter punches, we must move beyond the 
politics of analogy and engage our differences directly, respectfully, and 
unapologetically. 142 
Those who believe that marriage is simply state-endorsed intimacy see 
an analogy between Loving and Baehr, because they have first redefined 
marriage in those terms, and have then made the analogy. To them, both 
the Virginia and Hawaii statutes distort the truth about marriage. Those, in 
tum, who believe that marriage is a unique male-female sexual community 
are going to see an analogy between Commonwealth and Baehr, because 
both decisions distort the truth about marriage. The former distorting the 
definition of marriage to support racism, and the latter distorting marriage 
in support of "same-sex marriage." There is more than one Loving anal-
ogy, if there is any analogy at all. 
If this is so-and I suggest that it is-let us see it for what it is. Then 
let us move beyond it, and stop the unsophisticated game of playing the 
Loving card and calling our opponents bigots. Instead, let us focus on the 
real and difficult issues that confront us: Who decides what is marriage: the 
people, directly or through their elected representatives, or the courts? 
What is marriage: A contract between autonomous individuals? An inti-
mate, committed relationship? A unique male-female sexual community? 
And, perhaps most importantly, how shall we co-exist peacefully in a soci-
ety where people disagree about the answer to these questions? 
142. For a beginning of such a dialogue, see papers from the following three symposia: (1) 
Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, responded to by John M. Finnis, The 
Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Historical and Philosophical Observations 
(both forthcoming in 1997 AM. J. JURIS.). (2) Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative 
Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261 (1995), responded to by Robert P. George and Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage 
and the Liberal Imagination, id. at 321, followed by Macedo's Reply to Critics, id. at 329. (3) John 
M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and 'Sexual Orientation,' 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 11 
(1995), responded to by Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A Response to John 
Finnis, id. at 41, both of whom are then evaluated by Paul J. Weithman, A Propos of Professor 
Perry: A Plea for Philosophy in Sexual Ethics, id. at 75. 
